"Lucky War" Third Army in Desert Storm: Complete History of Persian Gulf War, Planning a Ground Offensive, General Norman Schwarzkopf, Air Power, Command and Control, Iraq and Kuwait, Yeosock
Nonfiction, History, Middle East, Persian Gulf War, Military
| Author: | Progressive Management | ISBN: | 9781310864360 |
| Publisher: | Progressive Management | Publication: | October 11, 2014 |
| Imprint: | Smashwords Edition | Language: | English |
| Author: | Progressive Management |
| ISBN: | 9781310864360 |
| Publisher: | Progressive Management |
| Publication: | October 11, 2014 |
| Imprint: | Smashwords Edition |
| Language: | English |
This unique ebook compilation includes a full reproduction of the important history of the Third Army in the Persian Gulf War - which provides a broad history of the conflict in addition to illuminating details of the Third Army's involvement - plus a bonus excerpt of the Final Report to Congress, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War.
The Gulf War was an undoubted success. It was also a war of clear, sharp contrasts. Saddam Hussein's rape of Kuwait was an obvious wrong that begged for setting right. Saddam's stranglehold on much of the world's proven oil reserves presented a clear and present danger to Western interests, and his wanton attack on Kuwait posed a clear threat to his Arab brothers. Moreover, Saddam's own ineptness in dealing with the crisis ensured the unity of the global community against him unless the diplomatic effort to resolve the situation was seriously mishandled. It was altogether a war of the old comfortable sort—good against evil, a wrong to be righted—a crusade.
It was for all that a difficult strategic and operational challenge for the American armed forces, which at first found themselves badly out of position. Though freed of the Soviet threat, U.S. forces were still deployed along the inter-German border and, half a world away, in the continental United States. Saddam was able to snap up Kuwait before Western military forces could intervene. In early August 1990, there was much to be done and precious little time in which to do it. It was a long road to the greatly unbalanced victory on the last day of February in 1991.
The purpose of this book is to provide an account, from the point of view of the U.S. Army forces employed, of the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War, from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait to the withdrawal of coalition forces from southeastern Iraq. Like all contemporary history, this is written in one respect to provide work for revisionists. That is to say, it is written from the evidence at hand and from the author's observations as the Third Army historian. Much evidence remains unavailable. The Army is very bad at collecting the documentary record of its activities in any sort of systematic way. It certainly is not expeditious about it. The principal actors are only beginning to tell their stories. General Schwarzkopf's account, flawed by much unsupported special pleading, remains to be answered by those he indicts. Moreover, we know very little of the enemy's intentions and the reasons and details surrounding Saddam Hussein's actions. Perhaps we may never know much more. So in many ways this history, like all history, is necessarily imperfect.
TO THE SOLDIERS OF THIRD ARMY * Contents * Preface * Acknowledgments * Introduction * Chapter 1 - Prologue to Operation Desert Shield * Chapter 2 - Executing a Contingency * Chapter 3 - Planning a Ground Offensive I: The CINC's Study Group * Chapter 4 - Planning a Ground Offensive II: The ARCENT Process * Chapter 5 - Build-up to Attack * Chapter 6 - Desert Storm: Air Power and Final Issues * Chapter 7 - Desert Storm: Battle * Chapter 8 - Battle's End * Chapter 9 - Conclusions: "A Famous Victory?" * Appendixes * A. Command and Control, ARCENT, February 1991 * B. Task Organization, Operation Desert Shield, 5 March 1991 * C. Warfighting Command and Control, XVIII Airborne Corps * D. The XVIII Airborne Corps' Task Organization, 5 March 1991 * E. Warfighting Command and Control, VII Corps * F. The VII Corps' Task Organization, 5 March 1991 * G. Current Combat Capability, 24 February 1991 * H. Chronology * Glossary * Bibliography
This unique ebook compilation includes a full reproduction of the important history of the Third Army in the Persian Gulf War - which provides a broad history of the conflict in addition to illuminating details of the Third Army's involvement - plus a bonus excerpt of the Final Report to Congress, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War.
The Gulf War was an undoubted success. It was also a war of clear, sharp contrasts. Saddam Hussein's rape of Kuwait was an obvious wrong that begged for setting right. Saddam's stranglehold on much of the world's proven oil reserves presented a clear and present danger to Western interests, and his wanton attack on Kuwait posed a clear threat to his Arab brothers. Moreover, Saddam's own ineptness in dealing with the crisis ensured the unity of the global community against him unless the diplomatic effort to resolve the situation was seriously mishandled. It was altogether a war of the old comfortable sort—good against evil, a wrong to be righted—a crusade.
It was for all that a difficult strategic and operational challenge for the American armed forces, which at first found themselves badly out of position. Though freed of the Soviet threat, U.S. forces were still deployed along the inter-German border and, half a world away, in the continental United States. Saddam was able to snap up Kuwait before Western military forces could intervene. In early August 1990, there was much to be done and precious little time in which to do it. It was a long road to the greatly unbalanced victory on the last day of February in 1991.
The purpose of this book is to provide an account, from the point of view of the U.S. Army forces employed, of the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War, from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait to the withdrawal of coalition forces from southeastern Iraq. Like all contemporary history, this is written in one respect to provide work for revisionists. That is to say, it is written from the evidence at hand and from the author's observations as the Third Army historian. Much evidence remains unavailable. The Army is very bad at collecting the documentary record of its activities in any sort of systematic way. It certainly is not expeditious about it. The principal actors are only beginning to tell their stories. General Schwarzkopf's account, flawed by much unsupported special pleading, remains to be answered by those he indicts. Moreover, we know very little of the enemy's intentions and the reasons and details surrounding Saddam Hussein's actions. Perhaps we may never know much more. So in many ways this history, like all history, is necessarily imperfect.
TO THE SOLDIERS OF THIRD ARMY * Contents * Preface * Acknowledgments * Introduction * Chapter 1 - Prologue to Operation Desert Shield * Chapter 2 - Executing a Contingency * Chapter 3 - Planning a Ground Offensive I: The CINC's Study Group * Chapter 4 - Planning a Ground Offensive II: The ARCENT Process * Chapter 5 - Build-up to Attack * Chapter 6 - Desert Storm: Air Power and Final Issues * Chapter 7 - Desert Storm: Battle * Chapter 8 - Battle's End * Chapter 9 - Conclusions: "A Famous Victory?" * Appendixes * A. Command and Control, ARCENT, February 1991 * B. Task Organization, Operation Desert Shield, 5 March 1991 * C. Warfighting Command and Control, XVIII Airborne Corps * D. The XVIII Airborne Corps' Task Organization, 5 March 1991 * E. Warfighting Command and Control, VII Corps * F. The VII Corps' Task Organization, 5 March 1991 * G. Current Combat Capability, 24 February 1991 * H. Chronology * Glossary * Bibliography
