A Rebuttal to the 2010 Marine Corps Operating Concept (MOC) - Assuring Littoral Access, Winning Small Wars, USMC History, Shift in Focus from Combined Arms Mechanized Forces to Irregular Warfare
Nonfiction, History, Military, Strategy, Naval
| Author: | Progressive Management | ISBN: | 9781311730152 |
| Publisher: | Progressive Management | Publication: | May 31, 2016 |
| Imprint: | Smashwords Edition | Language: | English |
| Author: | Progressive Management |
| ISBN: | 9781311730152 |
| Publisher: | Progressive Management |
| Publication: | May 31, 2016 |
| Imprint: | Smashwords Edition |
| Language: | English |
This excellent report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. The 2010 Marine Corps Operating Concept (MOC) Assuring Littoral Access... Winning Small Wars makes the assertion that conventional forces designed, trained, and equipped for major combat operations against a peer competitor would not be equally adept at operations to counter insurgents, guerilla forces, and other irregular threats. The MOC states that the Marine Corps should shift more toward to what Rudyard Kipling called "the savage wars of peace." The MOC calls for a break in the focus on combined arms maneuver of mechanized forces that had predominated since the Vietnam War and provides guidance for the preparation of what it believes will be the most likely form of combat - irregular warfare.
This shift in focus has the potential to jeopardize the Marine Corps' ability to field a force capable of responding across the range of military operations. This topic is significant because it reverses an approach adopted over the last one hundred years that has aimed to field a balanced combined arms team. The MOC's assertions caused this author to ask the following questions: Is the MOC right? Are Marine Corps forces designed, trained, and equipped for major combat operations against a peer competitor unable to conduct operations to counter insurgents, guerilla forces, and other irregular threats? This monograph conducted a chronological review of Marine Corps operations from 1918-1945 and from 1946-1993 in order to test the MOC's assertions that, (1) Conventional forces designed, trained, and equipped for major combat operations would not be equally adept at operations to counter insurgents, guerilla forces, and other irregular threats; (2) Since small wars are the more frequent form of warfare, the Marine Corps should focus on their conduct. This monograph has concluded that since the battle at Belleau Wood in 1918, the Marine Corps has organized, trained, and equipped as a combined arms force in preparation for the conduct of high intensity combined arms battle. This approach, coupled with the creative, flexible, and versatile mindset of Marine leaders, has enabled the Marine Corps to succeed in both traditional and irregular warfare.
INTRODUCTION * BUILDING THE MODERN DAY MARINE CORPS 1918-1945 * Service as an Adjunct to the Army * The Small Wars Force-in-Readiness * Service With The Fleet * EVOLVING AND FORMALIZING THE MODERN DAY MARINE CORPS 1946-1993 * Service as an Adjunct to the Army * The Small Wars Force-in-Readiness * Service with the Fleet * CONCLUSION
This excellent report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. The 2010 Marine Corps Operating Concept (MOC) Assuring Littoral Access... Winning Small Wars makes the assertion that conventional forces designed, trained, and equipped for major combat operations against a peer competitor would not be equally adept at operations to counter insurgents, guerilla forces, and other irregular threats. The MOC states that the Marine Corps should shift more toward to what Rudyard Kipling called "the savage wars of peace." The MOC calls for a break in the focus on combined arms maneuver of mechanized forces that had predominated since the Vietnam War and provides guidance for the preparation of what it believes will be the most likely form of combat - irregular warfare.
This shift in focus has the potential to jeopardize the Marine Corps' ability to field a force capable of responding across the range of military operations. This topic is significant because it reverses an approach adopted over the last one hundred years that has aimed to field a balanced combined arms team. The MOC's assertions caused this author to ask the following questions: Is the MOC right? Are Marine Corps forces designed, trained, and equipped for major combat operations against a peer competitor unable to conduct operations to counter insurgents, guerilla forces, and other irregular threats? This monograph conducted a chronological review of Marine Corps operations from 1918-1945 and from 1946-1993 in order to test the MOC's assertions that, (1) Conventional forces designed, trained, and equipped for major combat operations would not be equally adept at operations to counter insurgents, guerilla forces, and other irregular threats; (2) Since small wars are the more frequent form of warfare, the Marine Corps should focus on their conduct. This monograph has concluded that since the battle at Belleau Wood in 1918, the Marine Corps has organized, trained, and equipped as a combined arms force in preparation for the conduct of high intensity combined arms battle. This approach, coupled with the creative, flexible, and versatile mindset of Marine leaders, has enabled the Marine Corps to succeed in both traditional and irregular warfare.
INTRODUCTION * BUILDING THE MODERN DAY MARINE CORPS 1918-1945 * Service as an Adjunct to the Army * The Small Wars Force-in-Readiness * Service With The Fleet * EVOLVING AND FORMALIZING THE MODERN DAY MARINE CORPS 1946-1993 * Service as an Adjunct to the Army * The Small Wars Force-in-Readiness * Service with the Fleet * CONCLUSION
