| Author: | Major Mark H. Skattum | ISBN: | 9781782896814 |
| Publisher: | Tannenberg Publishing | Publication: | August 15, 2014 |
| Imprint: | Tannenberg Publishing | Language: | English |
| Author: | Major Mark H. Skattum |
| ISBN: | 9781782896814 |
| Publisher: | Tannenberg Publishing |
| Publication: | August 15, 2014 |
| Imprint: | Tannenberg Publishing |
| Language: | English |
This monograph addresses the concept of air operations and their relationship to campaigns. It determines whether air actions should be considered as operations or campaigns. The monograph first addresses the definitions of the terms “campaign” and “operation,” and then establishes the criteria by which to judge three historical examples of the use of air power. These examples are the Battle of Britain, the Korean War air interdiction battle, and the Israeli pre-emptive strike against the Egyptian Air Force during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.
The monograph concludes that air operations should not be considered as campaigns. Air operations are part of the overall campaign and support campaign objectives rather than accomplishing strategic goals. The implications of this analysis are that air superiority should be the primary air operation; offensive air and ground operations must be synchronized for success; and the terms and concepts applied to ground operations can be applied to air operations. By understanding the correct relationship between air operations and campaigns, air planners can help Army planners prepare for success on the joint battlefield.
This monograph addresses the concept of air operations and their relationship to campaigns. It determines whether air actions should be considered as operations or campaigns. The monograph first addresses the definitions of the terms “campaign” and “operation,” and then establishes the criteria by which to judge three historical examples of the use of air power. These examples are the Battle of Britain, the Korean War air interdiction battle, and the Israeli pre-emptive strike against the Egyptian Air Force during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.
The monograph concludes that air operations should not be considered as campaigns. Air operations are part of the overall campaign and support campaign objectives rather than accomplishing strategic goals. The implications of this analysis are that air superiority should be the primary air operation; offensive air and ground operations must be synchronized for success; and the terms and concepts applied to ground operations can be applied to air operations. By understanding the correct relationship between air operations and campaigns, air planners can help Army planners prepare for success on the joint battlefield.
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![Cover of the book Air Power Versus U-Boats - Confronting Hitler’s Submarine Menace In The European Theater [Illustrated Edition] by Major Mark H. Skattum](https://www.kuoky.com/images/2014/august/300x300/9781782898900-VTs6_300x.jpg)
