An Aversion to Risk: A Warning From the Past: Comparison of 1862 American Civil War Peninsula Campaign with General McClellan to the 2003 Iraq War Failures, Afghanistan, Goldwater-Nichols, Petraeus

Nonfiction, History, Americas, United States, Civil War Period (1850-1877), Military
Cover of the book An Aversion to Risk: A Warning From the Past: Comparison of 1862 American Civil War Peninsula Campaign with General McClellan to the 2003 Iraq War Failures, Afghanistan, Goldwater-Nichols, Petraeus by Progressive Management, Progressive Management
View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart
Author: Progressive Management ISBN: 9781311130600
Publisher: Progressive Management Publication: October 30, 2014
Imprint: Smashwords Edition Language: English
Author: Progressive Management
ISBN: 9781311130600
Publisher: Progressive Management
Publication: October 30, 2014
Imprint: Smashwords Edition
Language: English

When U.S. forces departed Iraq on 15 December 2011 to return to the U.S., they did so much as General George B. McClellan had left the Peninsula to return to Washington, D.C. on 20 August 1862. The U.S. had lost a great deal of blood and treasure with little to show for its expenditure. This thesis addresses several aspects of the 1862 Peninsula Campaign and the 2003 Iraq invasion as well as the contemporary doctrine concerning risk. There were many contributing factors to the Army of the Potomac culminating in 1862 and U.S. failures in Iraq in 2003. A major contributing factor was reluctance for leaders at the strategic, operational, and tactical level to take risk. During the execution of these campaigns, as uncertainty clouded the theaters, the common characteristic among leaders was their greater appreciation of what might be lost than what could be gained, and taking counsel of their fears, they sidestepped hazard, but also opportunity, and opened the U.S. to greater risks. The 1862 Peninsular Campaign illuminates problems still with us despite 150 years of vast changes in the conduct of war. There are obvious differences between then and now, but there is an unsettling similarity. The culmination in 1862, and culmination during the post 9/11 campaigns, resulted from inadequate responses to risk aversion by the government and military leaders, when faced with uncertainty.

CHAPTER 1 * Thesis * CHAPTER 2 * Context of the Peninsula Campaign * The Strategic Environment in 1862 * McClellan's Background * Geography * The Plan * CHAPTER 3 * Execution * Lincoln and Stanton * Goldsborough and Missroon * McClellan * CHAPTER 4 * Contemporary Example * CHAPTER 5 * Synthesis / Conclusion

On 4 April 1862, 35-year-old Major General George B. McClellan and his Army of the Potomac stepped off from Fort Monroe, Virginia towards Richmond, Virginia; he did so with the largest army ever assembled in North America up to that time. It had 121,000 soldiers, 14,592 animals, 1,150 wagons, 74 ambulances, and 44 artillery batteries.1 A European advisor remarked that it resembled "the stride of a giant."2 Equally remarkable, 113 steamers, 188 schooners, and 88 barges floated McClellan's army from the outskirts of Washington, D.C. to Fort Monroe to establish its initial staging area.3 As one Confederate officer noted, "the thick clouds of trouble were gathering."4 McClellan's Army was four times the size of the Confederate force directly to his front, and backed by a nation possessing economic, technological, and demographic superiority over its opponent. Despite this tremendous combat power, McClellan's 1862 Peninsula Campaign ended in abject failure. The Army of the Potomac culminated eight miles from its intended objective, the Confederate capital of Richmond, even though it faced a weaker force commanded by an untried general. After six months and at the cost of 15,849 men,5 McClellan abandoned the campaign. The Army of the Potomac fell back to defend its own capital, and ultimately the Union interior itself, after the Confederate victory at Second Bull Run and subsequent invasion of Maryland. How, given so many advantages, did operational stalemate, followed by strategic crisis, result in so short a time?

View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart

When U.S. forces departed Iraq on 15 December 2011 to return to the U.S., they did so much as General George B. McClellan had left the Peninsula to return to Washington, D.C. on 20 August 1862. The U.S. had lost a great deal of blood and treasure with little to show for its expenditure. This thesis addresses several aspects of the 1862 Peninsula Campaign and the 2003 Iraq invasion as well as the contemporary doctrine concerning risk. There were many contributing factors to the Army of the Potomac culminating in 1862 and U.S. failures in Iraq in 2003. A major contributing factor was reluctance for leaders at the strategic, operational, and tactical level to take risk. During the execution of these campaigns, as uncertainty clouded the theaters, the common characteristic among leaders was their greater appreciation of what might be lost than what could be gained, and taking counsel of their fears, they sidestepped hazard, but also opportunity, and opened the U.S. to greater risks. The 1862 Peninsular Campaign illuminates problems still with us despite 150 years of vast changes in the conduct of war. There are obvious differences between then and now, but there is an unsettling similarity. The culmination in 1862, and culmination during the post 9/11 campaigns, resulted from inadequate responses to risk aversion by the government and military leaders, when faced with uncertainty.

CHAPTER 1 * Thesis * CHAPTER 2 * Context of the Peninsula Campaign * The Strategic Environment in 1862 * McClellan's Background * Geography * The Plan * CHAPTER 3 * Execution * Lincoln and Stanton * Goldsborough and Missroon * McClellan * CHAPTER 4 * Contemporary Example * CHAPTER 5 * Synthesis / Conclusion

On 4 April 1862, 35-year-old Major General George B. McClellan and his Army of the Potomac stepped off from Fort Monroe, Virginia towards Richmond, Virginia; he did so with the largest army ever assembled in North America up to that time. It had 121,000 soldiers, 14,592 animals, 1,150 wagons, 74 ambulances, and 44 artillery batteries.1 A European advisor remarked that it resembled "the stride of a giant."2 Equally remarkable, 113 steamers, 188 schooners, and 88 barges floated McClellan's army from the outskirts of Washington, D.C. to Fort Monroe to establish its initial staging area.3 As one Confederate officer noted, "the thick clouds of trouble were gathering."4 McClellan's Army was four times the size of the Confederate force directly to his front, and backed by a nation possessing economic, technological, and demographic superiority over its opponent. Despite this tremendous combat power, McClellan's 1862 Peninsula Campaign ended in abject failure. The Army of the Potomac culminated eight miles from its intended objective, the Confederate capital of Richmond, even though it faced a weaker force commanded by an untried general. After six months and at the cost of 15,849 men,5 McClellan abandoned the campaign. The Army of the Potomac fell back to defend its own capital, and ultimately the Union interior itself, after the Confederate victory at Second Bull Run and subsequent invasion of Maryland. How, given so many advantages, did operational stalemate, followed by strategic crisis, result in so short a time?

More books from Progressive Management

Cover of the book Call Sign: Dustoff: A History of U.S. Army Aeromedical Evacuation from Conception to Hurricane Katrina, MEDEVAC, Air Ambulance, MAST, Korea, Vietnam War, Persian Gulf War, Afghanistan, Iraq by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Department of Homeland Security Tribal Resource Guide: DHS Resources for Tribal Nations, Federal Agencies and Departments for Safety and Security by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Wallops Station and the Creation of an American Space Program: Sputnik, NASA, and Independence, Manned Space Flight, Mercury, Space Science Research, TIROS, V-2 to Sounding Rockets by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Reclamation: Managing Water in the West - The Bureau of Reclamation: Origins and Growth to 1945, Volume 1 - Part 1 - Great Depression, Glen Canyon Dam, Colorado River, Hoover Dam, Indian Land by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Decade of War, Volume I: Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations - Mistakes and Failures in the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, Strategic Themes and Recommendations by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Building the Decision-Making Environment in the Information Age: An Analysis of Defense Program Manager Decision-Making in Complex and Chaotic Program Environments - Sensemaking and Nousmaking by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Russian Organizational Learning in the Context of the Afghanistan and Chechnya Counterinsurgencies: Soviet Military History, Operational Art, World War II, Interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia by Progressive Management
Cover of the book 21st Century FEMA Study Course: NIMS Communications and Information Management (IS-704) - Interoperability, Mutual Aid and Assistance, Exercises, Scenarios by Progressive Management
Cover of the book The Three Wars of Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer: His Korean War Diary - Far East Air Forces Commander, Problems with Other Services, the Press, Contradictory and Conflicting Orders, Lack of Materiel by Progressive Management
Cover of the book The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory - Douhet, World War I and II, William Mitchell, Naval Theories, Continental Europe, Air Corps, deSeversky, Nuclear Strategy, Boyd, Warden, NATO by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Apollo and America's Moon Landing Program: Apollo Meteoroid Shielding Design and Analysis at the Manned Spacecraft Center by Progressive Management
Cover of the book 21st Century FEMA Study Course: Emergency Support Function #6 Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human Services (IS-806) - Voluntary Agencies, NVOADs, Disaster Recovery Guides by Progressive Management
Cover of the book 21st Century Adult Cancer Sourcebook: Penile Cancer (Cancer of the Penis) - Clinical Data for Patients, Families, and Physicians by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Regarding NATO: An Examination of the Alliance's Role in the Global War on Terrorism - Rogue and Failed States, Kosovo Legacy, Military Readiness, Afghanistan Case Study, American Leadership Role by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Reading the Tea Leaves: Proto-Insurgency in Honduras - How to Recognize An Insurgency While In Early Stages, Interagency Friction, Intelligence Assessments, Nature of the Conflict, General John Galvin by Progressive Management
We use our own "cookies" and third party cookies to improve services and to see statistical information. By using this website, you agree to our Privacy Policy