ARDENNES-ALSACE (The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II)
Nonfiction, History, World History, Military, World War II
| Author: | Roger Cirillo | ISBN: | 1230000125948 |
| Publisher: | Maruay Ebooks | Publication: | April 9, 2013 |
| Imprint: | Language: | English |
| Author: | Roger Cirillo |
| ISBN: | 1230000125948 |
| Publisher: | Maruay Ebooks |
| Publication: | April 9, 2013 |
| Imprint: | |
| Language: | English |
ARDENNES-ALSACE (The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II)
-This ebook Included TOC for Reader.
-This sample in this ebook ;
Commanders and intelligence officers (G–2) at every level— from the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), to the divisions holding the line—judged that the Germans were too weak to attempt regaining the initiative by a large-scale offensive. Despite their awareness that enemy units were refitting and concentrating across the line, they concluded exactly what Hitler had intended them to conclude. Knowing that the Germans were concerned with major threats to both the Ruhr and the Saar, Eisenhower’s G–2 believed that they probably would use the uncommitted Sixth Panzer Army, suspected to be in the northern Eifel, to bolster their weakening northern defenses, or at least to cripple the impending Allied push toward the Ruhr. Both Hodges’ and Patton’s G–2s viewed the enemy as a reflection of their own operational plans and thus assessed the German buildup as no more than preparations to counterattack the First and Third Armies’ assaults.
ARDENNES-ALSACE (The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II)
-This ebook Included TOC for Reader.
-This sample in this ebook ;
Commanders and intelligence officers (G–2) at every level— from the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), to the divisions holding the line—judged that the Germans were too weak to attempt regaining the initiative by a large-scale offensive. Despite their awareness that enemy units were refitting and concentrating across the line, they concluded exactly what Hitler had intended them to conclude. Knowing that the Germans were concerned with major threats to both the Ruhr and the Saar, Eisenhower’s G–2 believed that they probably would use the uncommitted Sixth Panzer Army, suspected to be in the northern Eifel, to bolster their weakening northern defenses, or at least to cripple the impending Allied push toward the Ruhr. Both Hodges’ and Patton’s G–2s viewed the enemy as a reflection of their own operational plans and thus assessed the German buildup as no more than preparations to counterattack the First and Third Armies’ assaults.
