Campaign Assessment in Counterinsurgency: Reinventing the Wheel - Vietnam War and MACV, Afghanistan and ISAF, Irrelevant Metrics Leading to Inaccurate and Useless Reports, Measures of Effectiveness

Nonfiction, History, Military, Vietnam War, Asian
Cover of the book Campaign Assessment in Counterinsurgency: Reinventing the Wheel - Vietnam War and MACV, Afghanistan and ISAF, Irrelevant Metrics Leading to Inaccurate and Useless Reports, Measures of Effectiveness by Progressive Management, Progressive Management
View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart
Author: Progressive Management ISBN: 9781370774999
Publisher: Progressive Management Publication: February 24, 2017
Imprint: Smashwords Edition Language: English
Author: Progressive Management
ISBN: 9781370774999
Publisher: Progressive Management
Publication: February 24, 2017
Imprint: Smashwords Edition
Language: English

This excellent report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. Strategic and political leaders have determined that the US and ISAF campaign assessments were neither useful nor accurate. The DOD 1230 biannual report titled the Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan provides comprehensive information to strategic and political leaders regarding the progress of the United States' strategy in Afghanistan. The report, however, has largely provided indicators of progress based off a single variable—enemy initiated ambushes. As attention drew to the failure of ISAF to provide accurate reporting, a degree of mistrust grew between strategic and political leaders and the military leaders in Afghanistan. In turn, strategic leaders made only partially informed decisions that did not reflect accurately the progress on the ground. The July 2013 DOD 1230 report touted a change in metrics, placing a greater emphasis on variables such as security force development and economic growth. The announcement of new metrics raised an obvious question, were the new measures of performance in Afghanistan actually better, and why had change taken so long?

Answering this research question required four steps. First, it was necessary to determine the importance of assessments and measures of performance in the development of strategy in the COIN environment. Second, it was necessary to examine how ISAF initially developed its assessment plan. Next, it was necessary to examine a historical instance of campaign assessments in COIN. The US and MACV in Vietnam experienced similar complications throughout the Vietnam War. Initially accused of intentionally bloating casualty figures, MACV made a concentrated effort to develop a more accurate assessment model to inform progress. The improved model, the Hamlet Evaluation System, analyzed a host of variables across South Vietnam to assess progress over time. Lastly, by comparing the efforts in Vietnam with those in Afghanistan it was possible to identify assessment concepts that would have been applicable in Afghanistan.

The evidence ultimately shows that as the US and ISAF sought to develop assessment measures, they replicated the errors made in Vietnam. Additionally, despite advances in technology, ISAF's assessment plan did not reach the level of sophistication that MACV achieved in Vietnam. Although the HES was criticized during the Vietnam War, the iterative attempts by MACV to improve its assessment plan provided useful lessons for the US and ISAF in Afghanistan.

View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart

This excellent report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. Strategic and political leaders have determined that the US and ISAF campaign assessments were neither useful nor accurate. The DOD 1230 biannual report titled the Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan provides comprehensive information to strategic and political leaders regarding the progress of the United States' strategy in Afghanistan. The report, however, has largely provided indicators of progress based off a single variable—enemy initiated ambushes. As attention drew to the failure of ISAF to provide accurate reporting, a degree of mistrust grew between strategic and political leaders and the military leaders in Afghanistan. In turn, strategic leaders made only partially informed decisions that did not reflect accurately the progress on the ground. The July 2013 DOD 1230 report touted a change in metrics, placing a greater emphasis on variables such as security force development and economic growth. The announcement of new metrics raised an obvious question, were the new measures of performance in Afghanistan actually better, and why had change taken so long?

Answering this research question required four steps. First, it was necessary to determine the importance of assessments and measures of performance in the development of strategy in the COIN environment. Second, it was necessary to examine how ISAF initially developed its assessment plan. Next, it was necessary to examine a historical instance of campaign assessments in COIN. The US and MACV in Vietnam experienced similar complications throughout the Vietnam War. Initially accused of intentionally bloating casualty figures, MACV made a concentrated effort to develop a more accurate assessment model to inform progress. The improved model, the Hamlet Evaluation System, analyzed a host of variables across South Vietnam to assess progress over time. Lastly, by comparing the efforts in Vietnam with those in Afghanistan it was possible to identify assessment concepts that would have been applicable in Afghanistan.

The evidence ultimately shows that as the US and ISAF sought to develop assessment measures, they replicated the errors made in Vietnam. Additionally, despite advances in technology, ISAF's assessment plan did not reach the level of sophistication that MACV achieved in Vietnam. Although the HES was criticized during the Vietnam War, the iterative attempts by MACV to improve its assessment plan provided useful lessons for the US and ISAF in Afghanistan.

More books from Progressive Management

Cover of the book History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Prelude to the War in Vietnam 1954-1959 - North and South Vietnam, Geneva Conference, Collins Mission by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Operation Ajax: A Case Study on Analyst-Policy Maker Tensions and the Challenges of Estimative Intelligence – CIA Covert Operation Coup Overthrowing Iran’s Elected Prime Minister Mossadeq by Progressive Management
Cover of the book China in 2030: Discord or "Harmonious Society"? Military Modernization, Influence of Culture, Demographics, New Boxers, Middle Kingdom Economic Development by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Striking the Balance between Discipline and Justice: The Commander's Role in the Military Justice System and its Impact on the Military Profession - Sexual Assault Scandals and History of Justice by Progressive Management
Cover of the book The Iran-Iraq War: Exceeding Means - Analysis of the Decision of Saddam Hussein to Invade Iran, Longest and Bloodiest War in Middle Eastern History, Ayatollah, Shia Unrest, Sunni, Bathist Regime by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Recruitment and Retention Manual - Guidebook for Managers and Recruiters of Volunteer and Career Personnel, Leadership, Stress Management, Marketing by Progressive Management
Cover of the book 21st Century NBC WMD CBRN Weapons and Terrorism: Water Security Handbook - Planning for and Responding to Drinking Water Contamination Threats and Incidents (Water Utility Planning Guide) by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Certainty is Illusion: The Myth of Strategic Guidance - World War II Pearl Harbor and Operation Torch and the Persian Gulf War Historical Experiments, Value of Strategic Thinking, Fact not Blunder by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Wildland Fire in Ecosystems: Effects of Fire on Soil and Water (Rainbow Series) - Wildfires and Ecosystems, Soil Chemistry, Biology, Hydrologic Cycle, Watersheds, Streamflows, Aquatic Biota, Wetlands by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Fair Share or Freeride: Burden Sharing in Post-Cold War NATO – Analysis Showing that Most Members Contribute Effectively to Funding and Military Operations, Study of Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan by Progressive Management
Cover of the book 21st Century U.S. Military Manuals: Shipboard Operations (FM 1-564) - Army Aviation Unit Operations from Navy and Coast Guard Ships (Professional Format Series) by Progressive Management
Cover of the book The Center of Gravity (COG) Systemically Understood - Clausewitz and Systems Thinking, Napoleon, Battles of Granicus, Issus, and Gaugamela, Jena-Auerstadt 1806, Vietnam War (Cambodia), Desert Storm by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Apollo and America's Moon Landing Program: NASA's Management of Moon Rocks and Other Astromaterials Loaned for Research, Education, and Public Display (NASA Inspector General Report 2011) by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Reclamation: Managing Water in the West - The Bureau of Reclamation: Origins and Growth to 1945, Volume 1 - Part 2 - Great Depression, Glen Canyon Dam, Colorado River, Hoover Dam, Indian Land by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Stability Economics: The Economic Foundations of Security in Post-conflict Environments - Iraq and Afghanistan, Shari'a Compliant Finance, Odierno, Petraeus, Shining Path Guerrillas by Progressive Management
We use our own "cookies" and third party cookies to improve services and to see statistical information. By using this website, you agree to our Privacy Policy