Collective Action under the Articles of Confederation
Nonfiction, Social & Cultural Studies, Political Science, Government, Reference & Language, Reference
| Author: | Keith L. Dougherty | ISBN: | 9781107385566 |
| Publisher: | Cambridge University Press | Publication: | December 18, 2000 |
| Imprint: | Cambridge University Press | Language: | English |
| Author: | Keith L. Dougherty |
| ISBN: | 9781107385566 |
| Publisher: | Cambridge University Press |
| Publication: | December 18, 2000 |
| Imprint: | Cambridge University Press |
| Language: | English |
Rather than focusing on why the states did not contribute to the national government under the Articles of Confederation, Collective Action under the Articles of Confederation asks why they, in fact, did - even when they should not have been expected to contribute. Why did states pay large portions of their requisitions to the federal government when problems of collective action and the lack of governmental incentives suggest that they should not have? Using original data on Continental troop movements and federal debt holdings within each state, in this 2001 book, Dougherty shows that states contributed to the national government when doing so produced local gains. Such a theory stands in stark contrast to the standard argument that patriotism and civic duty encouraged state cooperation. Material incentives and local interests bound the union together and explained the push for constitutional reform more than the common pursuit of mutual goals.
Rather than focusing on why the states did not contribute to the national government under the Articles of Confederation, Collective Action under the Articles of Confederation asks why they, in fact, did - even when they should not have been expected to contribute. Why did states pay large portions of their requisitions to the federal government when problems of collective action and the lack of governmental incentives suggest that they should not have? Using original data on Continental troop movements and federal debt holdings within each state, in this 2001 book, Dougherty shows that states contributed to the national government when doing so produced local gains. Such a theory stands in stark contrast to the standard argument that patriotism and civic duty encouraged state cooperation. Material incentives and local interests bound the union together and explained the push for constitutional reform more than the common pursuit of mutual goals.
