Constructing Cassandra

Reframing Intelligence Failure at the CIA, 1947–2001

Nonfiction, Social & Cultural Studies, Political Science
Cover of the book Constructing Cassandra by Milo Jones, Philippe Silberzahn, Stanford University Press
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Author: Milo Jones, Philippe Silberzahn ISBN: 9780804787154
Publisher: Stanford University Press Publication: August 21, 2013
Imprint: Stanford Security Studies Language: English
Author: Milo Jones, Philippe Silberzahn
ISBN: 9780804787154
Publisher: Stanford University Press
Publication: August 21, 2013
Imprint: Stanford Security Studies
Language: English

Constructing Cassandra analyzes the intelligence failures at the CIA that resulted in four key strategic surprises experienced by the US: the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the Iranian revolution of 1978, the collapse of the USSR in 1991, and the 9/11 terrorist attacks—surprises still play out today in U.S. policy. Although there has been no shortage of studies exploring how intelligence failures can happen, none of them have been able to provide a unified understanding of the phenomenon. To correct that omission, this book brings culture and identity to the foreground to present a unified model of strategic surprise; one that focuses on the internal make-up the CIA, and takes seriously those Cassandras who offered warnings, but were ignored. This systematic exploration of the sources of the CIA's intelligence failures points to ways to prevent future strategic surprises.

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Constructing Cassandra analyzes the intelligence failures at the CIA that resulted in four key strategic surprises experienced by the US: the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the Iranian revolution of 1978, the collapse of the USSR in 1991, and the 9/11 terrorist attacks—surprises still play out today in U.S. policy. Although there has been no shortage of studies exploring how intelligence failures can happen, none of them have been able to provide a unified understanding of the phenomenon. To correct that omission, this book brings culture and identity to the foreground to present a unified model of strategic surprise; one that focuses on the internal make-up the CIA, and takes seriously those Cassandras who offered warnings, but were ignored. This systematic exploration of the sources of the CIA's intelligence failures points to ways to prevent future strategic surprises.

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