External Intervention and the Politics of State Formation
China, Indonesia, and Thailand, 1893–1952
Nonfiction, Social & Cultural Studies, Political Science, International, Business & Finance, Economics
| Author: | Ja Ian Chong | ISBN: | 9781139508070 |
| Publisher: | Cambridge University Press | Publication: | June 29, 2012 |
| Imprint: | Cambridge University Press | Language: | English |
| Author: | Ja Ian Chong |
| ISBN: | 9781139508070 |
| Publisher: | Cambridge University Press |
| Publication: | June 29, 2012 |
| Imprint: | Cambridge University Press |
| Language: | English |
This book explores ways foreign intervention and external rivalries can affect the institutionalization of governance in weak states. When sufficiently competitive, foreign rivalries in a weak state can actually foster the political centralization, territoriality and autonomy associated with state sovereignty. This counterintuitive finding comes from studying the collective effects of foreign contestation over a weak state as informed by changes in the expected opportunity cost of intervention for outside actors. When interveners associate high opportunity costs with intervention, they bolster sovereign statehood as a next best alternative to their worst fear - domination of that polity by adversaries. Sovereign statehood develops if foreign actors concurrently and consistently behave this way toward a weak state. This book evaluates that argument against three 'least likely' cases - China, Indonesia and Thailand between the late nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries.
This book explores ways foreign intervention and external rivalries can affect the institutionalization of governance in weak states. When sufficiently competitive, foreign rivalries in a weak state can actually foster the political centralization, territoriality and autonomy associated with state sovereignty. This counterintuitive finding comes from studying the collective effects of foreign contestation over a weak state as informed by changes in the expected opportunity cost of intervention for outside actors. When interveners associate high opportunity costs with intervention, they bolster sovereign statehood as a next best alternative to their worst fear - domination of that polity by adversaries. Sovereign statehood develops if foreign actors concurrently and consistently behave this way toward a weak state. This book evaluates that argument against three 'least likely' cases - China, Indonesia and Thailand between the late nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries.
