Fichte's Ethics

Nonfiction, Religion & Spirituality, Philosophy, History, Criticism, & Surveys, Ethics & Moral Philosophy
Cover of the book Fichte's Ethics by Michelle Kosch, OUP Oxford
View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart
Author: Michelle Kosch ISBN: 9780192537539
Publisher: OUP Oxford Publication: March 9, 2018
Imprint: OUP Oxford Language: English
Author: Michelle Kosch
ISBN: 9780192537539
Publisher: OUP Oxford
Publication: March 9, 2018
Imprint: OUP Oxford
Language: English

One of Fichte's most important ideas - that nature can place limits on our ability to govern ourselves, and that anyone who values autonomy is thereby committed to the value of basic research and of the development of autonomy-enhancing technologies - has received little attention in the interpretative literature on Fichte, and has little currency in contemporary ethics. This volume aims to address both deficits. Beginning from a reconstruction of Fichte's theory of rational agency, this volume examines his arguments for the thesis that rational agency must have two constitutive ends: substantive and formal independence. It argues for a novel interpretation of Fichte's conception of substantive independence, and shows how Fichte's account of moral duties is derived from the end of substantive independence on that conception. It also argues for a new interpretation of Fichte's conception of formal independence, and explains why the usual understanding of this end as providing direct guidance for action must be mistaken. It encompasses a systematic reconstruction of Fichte's first-order claims in normative ethics and the philosophy of right.

View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart

One of Fichte's most important ideas - that nature can place limits on our ability to govern ourselves, and that anyone who values autonomy is thereby committed to the value of basic research and of the development of autonomy-enhancing technologies - has received little attention in the interpretative literature on Fichte, and has little currency in contemporary ethics. This volume aims to address both deficits. Beginning from a reconstruction of Fichte's theory of rational agency, this volume examines his arguments for the thesis that rational agency must have two constitutive ends: substantive and formal independence. It argues for a novel interpretation of Fichte's conception of substantive independence, and shows how Fichte's account of moral duties is derived from the end of substantive independence on that conception. It also argues for a new interpretation of Fichte's conception of formal independence, and explains why the usual understanding of this end as providing direct guidance for action must be mistaken. It encompasses a systematic reconstruction of Fichte's first-order claims in normative ethics and the philosophy of right.

More books from OUP Oxford

Cover of the book Rebellions and Revolutions by Michelle Kosch
Cover of the book Moss, Fletcher and Isaacs on the EU Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings by Michelle Kosch
Cover of the book The Politics of Presence by Michelle Kosch
Cover of the book The Unity of Perception by Michelle Kosch
Cover of the book An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations by Michelle Kosch
Cover of the book Psychology: A Very Short Introduction by Michelle Kosch
Cover of the book Russia in Revolution by Michelle Kosch
Cover of the book The Norman Conquest: A Very Short Introduction by Michelle Kosch
Cover of the book East Wind by Michelle Kosch
Cover of the book The Month that Changed the World by Michelle Kosch
Cover of the book Emma by Michelle Kosch
Cover of the book Nutrition: A Very Short Introduction by Michelle Kosch
Cover of the book Imagining the Woman Reader in the Age of Dante by Michelle Kosch
Cover of the book The Economics of Chocolate by Michelle Kosch
Cover of the book John Duns Scotus by Michelle Kosch
We use our own "cookies" and third party cookies to improve services and to see statistical information. By using this website, you agree to our Privacy Policy