Governing Uranium in the United States
Nonfiction, Social & Cultural Studies, Political Science, International, International Security
| Author: | Sharon Squassoni, Stephanie Cooke, Robert Kim, Jacob Greenberg | ISBN: | 9781442228184 |
| Publisher: | Center for Strategic & International Studies | Publication: | March 25, 2014 |
| Imprint: | Center for Strategic & International Studies | Language: | English |
| Author: | Sharon Squassoni, Stephanie Cooke, Robert Kim, Jacob Greenberg |
| ISBN: | 9781442228184 |
| Publisher: | Center for Strategic & International Studies |
| Publication: | March 25, 2014 |
| Imprint: | Center for Strategic & International Studies |
| Language: | English |
As part of the global Governing Uranium Project headed by the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) analyzed U.S. experiences with the security of its “front-end” uranium industry. This report examines current U.S. regulation and industry practices regarding security measures and controls over natural uranium prior to enrichment. Topics include prudent management practices, export-import controls, transportation, physical protection, and material accounting. The report highlights security analysis on uranium mining, milling, and conversion, which have historically enjoyed less proliferation scrutiny than other components of the nuclear fuel cycle.
As part of the global Governing Uranium Project headed by the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) analyzed U.S. experiences with the security of its “front-end” uranium industry. This report examines current U.S. regulation and industry practices regarding security measures and controls over natural uranium prior to enrichment. Topics include prudent management practices, export-import controls, transportation, physical protection, and material accounting. The report highlights security analysis on uranium mining, milling, and conversion, which have historically enjoyed less proliferation scrutiny than other components of the nuclear fuel cycle.
