Hole of Government: Sealing the Gap in U.S. Stability Operations - Machiavellian State Politics, Liberated or Occupied States, Germany World War II, Vietnam, Small Wars, State and Defense Department
Nonfiction, History, Military, Strategy, World War II
| Author: | Progressive Management | ISBN: | 9781311548511 |
| Publisher: | Progressive Management | Publication: | May 22, 2016 |
| Imprint: | Smashwords Edition | Language: | English |
| Author: | Progressive Management |
| ISBN: | 9781311548511 |
| Publisher: | Progressive Management |
| Publication: | May 22, 2016 |
| Imprint: | Smashwords Edition |
| Language: | English |
This excellent report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. This paper analyzes the operational environment to argue that competent stability operations are the most effective means to influence the population-centric vulnerabilities of prevalent adversaries. Lessons from the post-WWII occupation of Germany, CORDS efforts in Vietnam, and extensive U.S. stability operations history clearly demonstrate that security, expertise, and unity of command are the critical tenets of successful stability operations. Thesis recommends integration of these three tenets into the U.S. military for rapid adaptation of national power to the strategic environment. The efficiency of the U.S. to intervene successfully in failed states is dependent on security, expertise, and unity of command.
United States performance in the nine and seven year wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively, has illustrated the inefficiency of national means to influence stability operations there. This is indicative of a systemic problem caused by changes in the operational environment, a lingering conventional power paradigm within the U.S. national security establishment, and the relative resistance of trans-national terrorist and criminal non-state actors to U.S. conventional combat dominance. Demographic pressures, globalization trends, and empowerment of non-state actors favor the development of weak, liberated, and occupied states beyond historic 20th century norms. The U.S. must hone effective national means to influence these conditions in order to succeed in that strategic environment.
Chapter 1 - THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT * HISTORIC CONTEXT * Methods * Means * Actors * Perception * POST-COLD WAR * Rise of Non-State Actors * Weak, Liberated, and Occupied States * Shifting Means * FUTURE TRENDS * Population Instability * Destructive Capacity of the Individual * Machiavellian State Politics * Chapter 2 - STRATEGIC ANALYSIS * THE NON-STATE ACTOR * WEAK, LIBERATED, OR OCCUPIED STATES * STABILITY OPERATIONS PROFICIENCY * Chapter 3 - UNITED STATES STABILITY OPERATIONS * HISTORY OF U.S. STABILITY OPERATIONS * The Domestic Era * A World Power * World Wars and Small Wars * U.S. REACTION * Calls for National Reform * Department of State * Department of Defense * OCCUPATION OF GERMANY DURING WWII * 1967-1973 CORDS IN VIETNAM * LESSONS (UN)LEARNED * Chapter 4 - RECOMMENDATIONS * NATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS * DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONSIDERATIONS * CONCLUSION * BIBLIOGRAPHY
This excellent report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. This paper analyzes the operational environment to argue that competent stability operations are the most effective means to influence the population-centric vulnerabilities of prevalent adversaries. Lessons from the post-WWII occupation of Germany, CORDS efforts in Vietnam, and extensive U.S. stability operations history clearly demonstrate that security, expertise, and unity of command are the critical tenets of successful stability operations. Thesis recommends integration of these three tenets into the U.S. military for rapid adaptation of national power to the strategic environment. The efficiency of the U.S. to intervene successfully in failed states is dependent on security, expertise, and unity of command.
United States performance in the nine and seven year wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively, has illustrated the inefficiency of national means to influence stability operations there. This is indicative of a systemic problem caused by changes in the operational environment, a lingering conventional power paradigm within the U.S. national security establishment, and the relative resistance of trans-national terrorist and criminal non-state actors to U.S. conventional combat dominance. Demographic pressures, globalization trends, and empowerment of non-state actors favor the development of weak, liberated, and occupied states beyond historic 20th century norms. The U.S. must hone effective national means to influence these conditions in order to succeed in that strategic environment.
Chapter 1 - THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT * HISTORIC CONTEXT * Methods * Means * Actors * Perception * POST-COLD WAR * Rise of Non-State Actors * Weak, Liberated, and Occupied States * Shifting Means * FUTURE TRENDS * Population Instability * Destructive Capacity of the Individual * Machiavellian State Politics * Chapter 2 - STRATEGIC ANALYSIS * THE NON-STATE ACTOR * WEAK, LIBERATED, OR OCCUPIED STATES * STABILITY OPERATIONS PROFICIENCY * Chapter 3 - UNITED STATES STABILITY OPERATIONS * HISTORY OF U.S. STABILITY OPERATIONS * The Domestic Era * A World Power * World Wars and Small Wars * U.S. REACTION * Calls for National Reform * Department of State * Department of Defense * OCCUPATION OF GERMANY DURING WWII * 1967-1973 CORDS IN VIETNAM * LESSONS (UN)LEARNED * Chapter 4 - RECOMMENDATIONS * NATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS * DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONSIDERATIONS * CONCLUSION * BIBLIOGRAPHY
