In the Light of Experience
New Essays on Perception and Reasons
Nonfiction, Religion & Spirituality, Philosophy, Epistemology, Mind & Body
| Author: | ISBN: | 9780192537485 | |
| Publisher: | OUP Oxford | Publication: | June 14, 2018 |
| Imprint: | OUP Oxford | Language: | English |
| Author: | |
| ISBN: | 9780192537485 |
| Publisher: | OUP Oxford |
| Publication: | June 14, 2018 |
| Imprint: | OUP Oxford |
| Language: | English |
How does the idea that perception must provide reasons for our empirical judgements constrain our conception of our perceptual experiences? This volume presents ten new essays on perception which in different ways address this fundamental question. Charles Travis and John McDowell debate whether we need to ascribe content to experience in order to understand how it can provide the subject with reasons. Other essays address issues such as the following: What exactly is the Myth of the Given and why should it be worthwhile to try to avoid it? What constitutes our experiential reasons? Is it experiences themselves, the objects of experiences, or facts about our experiences? Should we conceive of experiential reasons as conclusive reasons? How should we conceive of the fallibility of our perceptual capacities if we think of experiences as capable of providing conclusive reasons? How should we conceive of the objects of experience? The contributors offer a variety of views on the reason-giving potential of experience, engaging explicitly and critically with each other's work.
How does the idea that perception must provide reasons for our empirical judgements constrain our conception of our perceptual experiences? This volume presents ten new essays on perception which in different ways address this fundamental question. Charles Travis and John McDowell debate whether we need to ascribe content to experience in order to understand how it can provide the subject with reasons. Other essays address issues such as the following: What exactly is the Myth of the Given and why should it be worthwhile to try to avoid it? What constitutes our experiential reasons? Is it experiences themselves, the objects of experiences, or facts about our experiences? Should we conceive of experiential reasons as conclusive reasons? How should we conceive of the fallibility of our perceptual capacities if we think of experiences as capable of providing conclusive reasons? How should we conceive of the objects of experience? The contributors offer a variety of views on the reason-giving potential of experience, engaging explicitly and critically with each other's work.
