Leadership and Parochialism: An Enduring Reality? Defense Reorganization, Bias in Praxis, Just Cause and Persian Gulf War, Colin Powell, Schwarzkopf, Jointness Attitudes
Nonfiction, History, Middle East, Persian Gulf War, Military, United States
| Author: | Progressive Management | ISBN: | 9781311733122 |
| Publisher: | Progressive Management | Publication: | June 11, 2016 |
| Imprint: | Smashwords Edition | Language: | English |
| Author: | Progressive Management |
| ISBN: | 9781311733122 |
| Publisher: | Progressive Management |
| Publication: | June 11, 2016 |
| Imprint: | Smashwords Edition |
| Language: | English |
This excellent report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. A military culture influenced by rigid planning and structured regulation dictates a rational approach to crisis response. But organizational influences can enter the decisionmaking process. One critic, for example, argues that standard operating procedures as well as survival instincts and a desire for prestige can influence and bias deci-sions. A large bureaucratic structure encourages such agenda setting and distorts reports made available to decisionmakers. Moreover, staffs filter and order huge amounts of data received during a crisis, which naturally colors the upward flow of information as it assumes the form of options and recommendations. This article examines the organizational impediments to optimal military responses in a crisis.
According to the late Carl Builder, the services have unique sets of organizational attitudes and beliefs. As the most powerful institutions in the national security community, the services have distinctive organizational personalities that dictate much of their behavior. Therefore the attitudes of individual servicemembers are a subset of organizational attitudes in any given service. There is a strong tendency through socialization, education, and self-regulation to migrate individual beliefs toward centralized institutional attitudes. The way services manipulate information affects decisionmaking in crises. Research into cognition suggests that complex decisionmaking forces human minds to break down information. Cognitive forces also tend to be more absolute in crises and more uncertain when decisionmakers lack time to assimilate facts. In an era of exploding sources of knowledge, decisionmakers depend on information provided by organizations with many entrenched prejudices.
This excellent report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. A military culture influenced by rigid planning and structured regulation dictates a rational approach to crisis response. But organizational influences can enter the decisionmaking process. One critic, for example, argues that standard operating procedures as well as survival instincts and a desire for prestige can influence and bias deci-sions. A large bureaucratic structure encourages such agenda setting and distorts reports made available to decisionmakers. Moreover, staffs filter and order huge amounts of data received during a crisis, which naturally colors the upward flow of information as it assumes the form of options and recommendations. This article examines the organizational impediments to optimal military responses in a crisis.
According to the late Carl Builder, the services have unique sets of organizational attitudes and beliefs. As the most powerful institutions in the national security community, the services have distinctive organizational personalities that dictate much of their behavior. Therefore the attitudes of individual servicemembers are a subset of organizational attitudes in any given service. There is a strong tendency through socialization, education, and self-regulation to migrate individual beliefs toward centralized institutional attitudes. The way services manipulate information affects decisionmaking in crises. Research into cognition suggests that complex decisionmaking forces human minds to break down information. Cognitive forces also tend to be more absolute in crises and more uncertain when decisionmakers lack time to assimilate facts. In an era of exploding sources of knowledge, decisionmakers depend on information provided by organizations with many entrenched prejudices.
