Mind-Sets and Missiles: A First Hand Account of the Cuban Missile Crisis - Detailed Chronology of Intelligence Failures and Successes, President Kennedy and the Soviet Missiles in Cuba

Nonfiction, History, Military, Nuclear Warfare, United States
Cover of the book Mind-Sets and Missiles: A First Hand Account of the Cuban Missile Crisis - Detailed Chronology of Intelligence Failures and Successes, President Kennedy and the Soviet Missiles in Cuba by Progressive Management, Progressive Management
View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart
Author: Progressive Management ISBN: 9781301524143
Publisher: Progressive Management Publication: September 6, 2013
Imprint: Smashwords Edition Language: English
Author: Progressive Management
ISBN: 9781301524143
Publisher: Progressive Management
Publication: September 6, 2013
Imprint: Smashwords Edition
Language: English

This unique book provides a detailed chronology and analysis of the intelligence failures and successes of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The author, Mr. Kenneth Absher, contends that, when our national security is at stake, the United States should not hesitate to undertake risky intelligence collection operations, including espionage, to penetrate our adversary's deceptions. At the same time, the United States must also understand that our adversary may not believe the gravity of our policy warnings or may not allow its own agenda to be influenced by U.S. diplomatic pressure. As both a student of and key participant in the events of the crisis, the author is able to provide in-depth analysis of the failures and successes of the national intelligence community and executive leadership during the buildup to the confrontation, and the risky but successful actions which led to its peaceful settlement. From his analysis, the author suggests considerations relevant to the collection, analysis, and use of intelligence which have continuing application.

The author was assigned to Sherman Kent's Office of National Estimates (ONE) after completing his Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Junior Officer Training Program in June 1962. He was one of two analysts for Latin America in Kent's ONE. He was a participant in the drafting of every National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) and Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) on Cuba and the Soviet military build-up from June 1962 to February 1963. This paper describes how the crisis unfolded using the author's personal recollection, declassified documents, and many memoirs written by senior CIA officers and others who were participants. Lessons learned include the need to avoid having our political, analytical and intelligence collection mind-sets prevent us from acquiring and accurately analyzing intelligence about our adversaries true plans and intentions. When our national security is at stake, we should not hesitate to undertake risky intelligence collection operations including espionage, to penetrate our adversary's deceptions. We must also understand that our adversaries may not believe the gravity of our policy warnings or allow their own agendas to be influenced by diplomatic pressure. When Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev decided secretly to place offensive missiles in Cuba, he clearly did not believe President John Kennedy would use military action to enforce U.S. policy warnings against such a deployment.

The Seeds of Crisis - 1961 * Soviet Deception * The Vienna Summit * Technical Collection Versus Espionage * Khrushchev Pushes the Envelope * Intelligence Used to War Khrushchev * Kennedy Launches Operation MONGOOSE * Khrushchev Decides to Put Missiles in Cuba * Khrushchev Explains His Decision * The Soviet Plan * Crisis Without Our Best Espionage Agent * Soviet Weapons and DCI Warnings * More Soviet Deception * Final Communication with Penkovsky * Additional Soviet Nuclear Weapons * Rapid Construction of Missile Sites * The DCI Honeymoon Cables * Aerial Reconnaissance and "The Photo Cap" * Opposition to U-2 Flights * The Failed Estimate * Sherman Kent Reflects * McCone Forces Approval of Overflights * The Deception Continues * Intelligence Not Disseminated * Missiles Discovered * Crisis Management * Soviet Deception and Presidential Warning * Estimates Lead to Policy Decisions * The President Decides to Blockade * Military Strike Reviewed * Briefing Ike, LBJ, and Allies * The President's Address and DEFCON 3 * DEFCON 2 * Initial Reaction * Official Soviet Reaction * The Darkest Day * The Final Warning * Aftermath * Missiles in Caves * The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board * Khrushchev Resigns * Lessons Learned

View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart

This unique book provides a detailed chronology and analysis of the intelligence failures and successes of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The author, Mr. Kenneth Absher, contends that, when our national security is at stake, the United States should not hesitate to undertake risky intelligence collection operations, including espionage, to penetrate our adversary's deceptions. At the same time, the United States must also understand that our adversary may not believe the gravity of our policy warnings or may not allow its own agenda to be influenced by U.S. diplomatic pressure. As both a student of and key participant in the events of the crisis, the author is able to provide in-depth analysis of the failures and successes of the national intelligence community and executive leadership during the buildup to the confrontation, and the risky but successful actions which led to its peaceful settlement. From his analysis, the author suggests considerations relevant to the collection, analysis, and use of intelligence which have continuing application.

The author was assigned to Sherman Kent's Office of National Estimates (ONE) after completing his Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Junior Officer Training Program in June 1962. He was one of two analysts for Latin America in Kent's ONE. He was a participant in the drafting of every National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) and Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) on Cuba and the Soviet military build-up from June 1962 to February 1963. This paper describes how the crisis unfolded using the author's personal recollection, declassified documents, and many memoirs written by senior CIA officers and others who were participants. Lessons learned include the need to avoid having our political, analytical and intelligence collection mind-sets prevent us from acquiring and accurately analyzing intelligence about our adversaries true plans and intentions. When our national security is at stake, we should not hesitate to undertake risky intelligence collection operations including espionage, to penetrate our adversary's deceptions. We must also understand that our adversaries may not believe the gravity of our policy warnings or allow their own agendas to be influenced by diplomatic pressure. When Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev decided secretly to place offensive missiles in Cuba, he clearly did not believe President John Kennedy would use military action to enforce U.S. policy warnings against such a deployment.

The Seeds of Crisis - 1961 * Soviet Deception * The Vienna Summit * Technical Collection Versus Espionage * Khrushchev Pushes the Envelope * Intelligence Used to War Khrushchev * Kennedy Launches Operation MONGOOSE * Khrushchev Decides to Put Missiles in Cuba * Khrushchev Explains His Decision * The Soviet Plan * Crisis Without Our Best Espionage Agent * Soviet Weapons and DCI Warnings * More Soviet Deception * Final Communication with Penkovsky * Additional Soviet Nuclear Weapons * Rapid Construction of Missile Sites * The DCI Honeymoon Cables * Aerial Reconnaissance and "The Photo Cap" * Opposition to U-2 Flights * The Failed Estimate * Sherman Kent Reflects * McCone Forces Approval of Overflights * The Deception Continues * Intelligence Not Disseminated * Missiles Discovered * Crisis Management * Soviet Deception and Presidential Warning * Estimates Lead to Policy Decisions * The President Decides to Blockade * Military Strike Reviewed * Briefing Ike, LBJ, and Allies * The President's Address and DEFCON 3 * DEFCON 2 * Initial Reaction * Official Soviet Reaction * The Darkest Day * The Final Warning * Aftermath * Missiles in Caves * The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board * Khrushchev Resigns * Lessons Learned

More books from Progressive Management

Cover of the book Libya: Federal Research Study and Country Profile with Comprehensive Information, History, and Analysis - Politics, Economy, Military - Muammar al Qadhafi by Progressive Management
Cover of the book The Role of Mental Illness Identification and Screening in Firearm Background Checks: Thorough Exploration of Legal, Procedural, and Clinical Implications of Identifying Potential Mass Shooters by Progressive Management
Cover of the book 2014 Essential Guide to the Ukraine and the Crisis with Russia: Battle for Kiev, Ukraine Military, Putin's Intervention, Yanukovych, Crimea, Sevastopol and Russian Fleet, Orange Revolution by Progressive Management
Cover of the book To Save a City: The Berlin Airlift 1948-1949 - Germany in Defeat after World War II, Marshall Plan, Pretext for Soviet Action, Global Logistics, Operation Vittles, Blockade Ends as Airlift Wins, NATO by Progressive Management
Cover of the book The Continental Army: War of American Independence (the Revolutionary War) - Basic Reference on the Military History of the Revolution, from New England in Arms to Victory at Yorktown by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Saturn IB Flight Manual (Skylab Saturn 1B Rocket) - Comprehensive Details of H-1 and J-2 Engines, S-IB and S-IVB Stages, Launch Facilities, Emergency Detection and Procedures by Progressive Management
Cover of the book United States Naval Aviation: 1910-2010 - Volume 1, Chronology: Authoritative Official History from the Earliest Pioneers to World War II, Cold War and Nuclear Weapons, Korean War, Vietnam and Beyond by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Wind Energy Multiyear Program Plan Through 2012: U.S. Department of Energy Programs for Large Wind, Systems Integration, Distributed Wind, Research and Development by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Sustaining Souls: Work of the U.S. Army Chaplain Corps, Soldiers and Families, Religious Formation and Chaplain Identity, Ethos, Commander Assessment of Effectiveness by Progressive Management
Cover of the book MH-53J/M PAVE LOW III/IV Systems Engineering Case Study: Challenges of Night Rescue and Night Vision; Technical Details and Program History by Progressive Management
Cover of the book The Origins of the "Golden Hour" of Medical Care and its Applicability to Combat Medicine: History of Casualty Care from World War I through Vietnam, Injury and Death in Combat, Evacuation Doctrine by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Decisionmaking in Operation Iraqi Freedom: Removing Saddam Hussein by Force - The Surge, General Casey, General Raymond Odierno, General David Petraeus, Ambassador Khalilzad by Progressive Management
Cover of the book 21st Century Adult Cancer Sourcebook: Rectal Cancer (Cancer of the Rectum) - Clinical Data for Patients, Families, and Physicians by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Russian Operational Art in the Russo-Georgian War of 2008: Decisive Campaign Gaining Control of Two Breakaway Republics, Roots of Soviet Thought and Practice, Cyberwar, South Ossetia by Progressive Management
Cover of the book 20th Century Nuclear Power Plant Accidents: Three Mile Island (TMI) Reactor Accident in Pennsylvania - Partial Meltdown, Radiation Releases, Causes, Report of the Presidential Commission on TMI by Progressive Management
We use our own "cookies" and third party cookies to improve services and to see statistical information. By using this website, you agree to our Privacy Policy