Operational Art In The Korean War: A Comparison Between General MacArthur And General Walker
Nonfiction, History, Asian, Korean War, Military, India
| Author: | Major Remco van Ingen | ISBN: | 9781786253903 |
| Publisher: | Normanby Press | Publication: | November 6, 2015 |
| Imprint: | Normanby Press | Language: | English |
| Author: | Major Remco van Ingen |
| ISBN: | 9781786253903 |
| Publisher: | Normanby Press |
| Publication: | November 6, 2015 |
| Imprint: | Normanby Press |
| Language: | English |
This monograph addresses operational art during a specific period of the Korean War. Both General Walton Walker and General Douglas MacArthur developed operational approaches to unify Korea when the decision was made to cross the 38th parallel into North Korea. General MacArthur’s approach used two major ground commands, was more daring, but more complicated. General Walker, on the other hand suggested an approach under one unified ground commander, seemed more methodical, and less daring. Ultimately, General MacArthur’s approach was the one executed. The X Corps amphibious assault did not bring the anticipated result. The out loading of X Corps, in preparation for the assault took longer than anticipated and the enemy had mined the sea approaches to Wonsan. These two factors combined with an unsynchronized ground attack by I ROK Corps eliminated the chance of a successful envelopment.
The monograph provides insight in the relationship between the commander’s personality, his previous operational experiences, and his preference for a particular type of operational approach.
This monograph addresses operational art during a specific period of the Korean War. Both General Walton Walker and General Douglas MacArthur developed operational approaches to unify Korea when the decision was made to cross the 38th parallel into North Korea. General MacArthur’s approach used two major ground commands, was more daring, but more complicated. General Walker, on the other hand suggested an approach under one unified ground commander, seemed more methodical, and less daring. Ultimately, General MacArthur’s approach was the one executed. The X Corps amphibious assault did not bring the anticipated result. The out loading of X Corps, in preparation for the assault took longer than anticipated and the enemy had mined the sea approaches to Wonsan. These two factors combined with an unsynchronized ground attack by I ROK Corps eliminated the chance of a successful envelopment.
The monograph provides insight in the relationship between the commander’s personality, his previous operational experiences, and his preference for a particular type of operational approach.
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