Sink or Swim: The Marine Corps Capacity to Conduct a Marine Expeditionary Brigade Amphibious Assault Using Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare - MEB Assault, Shipping Issues, Air Assault, Lift, Gulf War
Nonfiction, History, Military, Naval, United States
| Author: | Progressive Management | ISBN: | 9781311090997 |
| Publisher: | Progressive Management | Publication: | January 7, 2016 |
| Imprint: | Smashwords Edition | Language: | English |
| Author: | Progressive Management |
| ISBN: | 9781311090997 |
| Publisher: | Progressive Management |
| Publication: | January 7, 2016 |
| Imprint: | Smashwords Edition |
| Language: | English |
Professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction, this book addresses the equipment issues surrounding the expeditionary brigade's ability to conduct an amphibious assault under expeditionary maneuver warfare in three sections. The first section of the paper provides a background as to why the United States requires a strategic amphibious capability requirement today and its relevance against the projected future threat. The second section of paper uses the criteria of sufficiency and capability to examine the effect of equipment on the Navy and Marine Corps ability to conduct an amphibious assault using both the traditional and the contemporary Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare doctrinal concepts. The examination focuses on amphibious assault ships, AAV7A1 amphibious assault vehicles, expeditionary fighting vehicles (EFV), Sea Knight helicopter, and Osprey tiltrotor aircraft. The third section of the paper presents the conclusion that the Marine Corps can conduct a Marine expeditionary brigade amphibious assault, but not using Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare.
Since 1991, there has been a significant drop in the number of amphibious ships, a change in the forcible entry concept and a singular military and fiscal focus on the land wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The current state of amphibious assault ships, surface assault vehicles and assault support aircraft has suffered because of these events. Today, the readiness and capacity of the Navy and Marine Corps to plan and execute an amphibious landing on a beach against a prepared and modern enemy using modern doctrinal concepts is questionable. Can the Marine Corps conduct a Marine expeditionary brigade or MEB amphibious assault using Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare?
Due to the current military situation in the world and the focus of the Marine Corps on the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Marine Corps cannot conduct a Marine expeditionary brigade amphibious assault using the Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare. This is due to shortfalls in the quantity, availability and capability of current Navy amphibious shipping and Marine Corps equipment. There are solutions to the equipment dilemma. The Marine Corps can revalidate the strategic amphibious assault requirement. A revalidated strategic assault requirement would compel the Navy to acquire the necessary amphibious assault ships to lift the force. The Marine Corps must reiterate to Congress the requirement to procure the original number of expeditionary fighting vehicles, or rapidly develop or obtain a replacement vehicle to close the amphibious vehicle gap. Finally, the Marine Corps should look into blending the Osprey program with existing medium lift platforms to obtain an economically realistic, sustainable, and capable amphibious assault lift capability. In order to maintain an effective amphibious assault capability, current equipment shortfalls must be resolved. Once resolved, the Navy and Marine Corps will have enhanced their capacity to execute a Marine expeditionary brigade amphibious assault employing Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare.
Professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction, this book addresses the equipment issues surrounding the expeditionary brigade's ability to conduct an amphibious assault under expeditionary maneuver warfare in three sections. The first section of the paper provides a background as to why the United States requires a strategic amphibious capability requirement today and its relevance against the projected future threat. The second section of paper uses the criteria of sufficiency and capability to examine the effect of equipment on the Navy and Marine Corps ability to conduct an amphibious assault using both the traditional and the contemporary Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare doctrinal concepts. The examination focuses on amphibious assault ships, AAV7A1 amphibious assault vehicles, expeditionary fighting vehicles (EFV), Sea Knight helicopter, and Osprey tiltrotor aircraft. The third section of the paper presents the conclusion that the Marine Corps can conduct a Marine expeditionary brigade amphibious assault, but not using Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare.
Since 1991, there has been a significant drop in the number of amphibious ships, a change in the forcible entry concept and a singular military and fiscal focus on the land wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The current state of amphibious assault ships, surface assault vehicles and assault support aircraft has suffered because of these events. Today, the readiness and capacity of the Navy and Marine Corps to plan and execute an amphibious landing on a beach against a prepared and modern enemy using modern doctrinal concepts is questionable. Can the Marine Corps conduct a Marine expeditionary brigade or MEB amphibious assault using Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare?
Due to the current military situation in the world and the focus of the Marine Corps on the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Marine Corps cannot conduct a Marine expeditionary brigade amphibious assault using the Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare. This is due to shortfalls in the quantity, availability and capability of current Navy amphibious shipping and Marine Corps equipment. There are solutions to the equipment dilemma. The Marine Corps can revalidate the strategic amphibious assault requirement. A revalidated strategic assault requirement would compel the Navy to acquire the necessary amphibious assault ships to lift the force. The Marine Corps must reiterate to Congress the requirement to procure the original number of expeditionary fighting vehicles, or rapidly develop or obtain a replacement vehicle to close the amphibious vehicle gap. Finally, the Marine Corps should look into blending the Osprey program with existing medium lift platforms to obtain an economically realistic, sustainable, and capable amphibious assault lift capability. In order to maintain an effective amphibious assault capability, current equipment shortfalls must be resolved. Once resolved, the Navy and Marine Corps will have enhanced their capacity to execute a Marine expeditionary brigade amphibious assault employing Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare.
