The Arrow Impossibility Theorem

Nonfiction, Science & Nature, Mathematics, Game Theory, Business & Finance, Economics, Theory of Economics
Cover of the book The Arrow Impossibility Theorem by Eric Maskin, Amartya Sen, Columbia University Press
View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart
Author: Eric Maskin, Amartya Sen ISBN: 9780231526869
Publisher: Columbia University Press Publication: July 22, 2014
Imprint: Columbia University Press Language: English
Author: Eric Maskin, Amartya Sen
ISBN: 9780231526869
Publisher: Columbia University Press
Publication: July 22, 2014
Imprint: Columbia University Press
Language: English

Kenneth J. Arrow's pathbreaking "impossibility theorem" was a watershed innovation in the history of welfare economics, voting theory, and collective choice, demonstrating that there is no voting rule that satisfies the four desirable axioms of decisiveness, consensus, nondictatorship, and independence.

In this book Eric Maskin and Amartya Sen explore the implications of Arrow's theorem. Sen considers its ongoing utility, exploring the theorem's value and limitations in relation to recent research on social reasoning, and Maskin discusses how to design a voting rule that gets us closer to the ideal—given the impossibility of achieving the ideal. The volume also contains a contextual introduction by social choice scholar Prasanta K. Pattanaik and commentaries from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow himself, as well as essays by Maskin, Dasgupta, and Sen outlining the mathematical proof and framework behind their assertions.

View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart

Kenneth J. Arrow's pathbreaking "impossibility theorem" was a watershed innovation in the history of welfare economics, voting theory, and collective choice, demonstrating that there is no voting rule that satisfies the four desirable axioms of decisiveness, consensus, nondictatorship, and independence.

In this book Eric Maskin and Amartya Sen explore the implications of Arrow's theorem. Sen considers its ongoing utility, exploring the theorem's value and limitations in relation to recent research on social reasoning, and Maskin discusses how to design a voting rule that gets us closer to the ideal—given the impossibility of achieving the ideal. The volume also contains a contextual introduction by social choice scholar Prasanta K. Pattanaik and commentaries from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow himself, as well as essays by Maskin, Dasgupta, and Sen outlining the mathematical proof and framework behind their assertions.

More books from Columbia University Press

Cover of the book The Playful Crowd by Eric Maskin, Amartya Sen
Cover of the book Cinema in the Digital Age by Eric Maskin, Amartya Sen
Cover of the book Firestorm by Eric Maskin, Amartya Sen
Cover of the book Friends and Other Strangers by Eric Maskin, Amartya Sen
Cover of the book The Invention of Private Life by Eric Maskin, Amartya Sen
Cover of the book Strong Society, Smart State by Eric Maskin, Amartya Sen
Cover of the book Turks, Moors, and Englishmen in the Age of Discovery by Eric Maskin, Amartya Sen
Cover of the book Our Savage Art by Eric Maskin, Amartya Sen
Cover of the book Eqbal Ahmad by Eric Maskin, Amartya Sen
Cover of the book Global Corporate Governance by Eric Maskin, Amartya Sen
Cover of the book Motion(less) Pictures by Eric Maskin, Amartya Sen
Cover of the book The Cinema of Alexander Sokurov by Eric Maskin, Amartya Sen
Cover of the book Adolescents in Public Housing by Eric Maskin, Amartya Sen
Cover of the book Family-Centered Policies and Practices by Eric Maskin, Amartya Sen
Cover of the book Mambo Montage by Eric Maskin, Amartya Sen
We use our own "cookies" and third party cookies to improve services and to see statistical information. By using this website, you agree to our Privacy Policy