| Author: | James T. West | ISBN: | 9781462804436 |
| Publisher: | Xlibris US | Publication: | May 24, 2001 |
| Imprint: | Xlibris US | Language: | English |
| Author: | James T. West |
| ISBN: | 9781462804436 |
| Publisher: | Xlibris US |
| Publication: | May 24, 2001 |
| Imprint: | Xlibris US |
| Language: | English |
The End of an Era was written shortly after my retirement from Lockheed. I felt strongly about the events during the L-1011 years. The demise of the program left me without a job. I guess that in some ways I resented that. I wanted to blame the programs failure on somebody. My first draft did just that. I did point fingers. I wrote about what I felt was incompetence. Luckily, I threw my first version out. My next version began with reciting the facts, as I knew them. I had been there when decisions were made. I had been a part of the management team. Or, maybe I hadnt. Dan Haughton ran the show. He frequently shuffled people in and out of the program. In some sense, I felt like an observer. I stood to the side as this went on. Everything about Lockheed was attuned to DOD business. Lockheed was at the forefront of technical advances. We knew how to fly faster, higher, and with the largest payload. We knew little if anything about commercial business. Dont get me wrong, we knew how to design and build a commercial airplane. We just didnt know how to relate that to customers and customer satisfaction. Airlines bought the L-1011 because it was the best one out there and in spite of Lockheed. My original title was My Story of the L-1011. It wasnt until I read that first complete manuscript that I realized I was talking about the end of an era. Lockheed and corporate America were experiencing the birth of the modern manager, the MBA. The manager of the engineering division didnt need to know engineering, he had an MBA. The lack of commercial experience, the exodus of the knowledgeable manager, and the birth of the MBA, with his network, spelled nothing but disaster. I have been criticized for ignoring the engineering aspects of the L-1011. The strongest criticism is that I missed the boat. I didnt cite the RB211s failure. Rolls-Royce inability to achieve the necessary thrust was the downfall of the L-1011. Rolls-Royce failed, went bankrupt, but Lockheed management failed in being ill prepared for the event. Dan Haughton rolled the dice and put the program at risk of the Roll-Royce failure. In the early stages of the planes development Dan eliminated the ability to fly with a GE or Pratt engine. Sure, it saved money but it also put the program completely at risk of Rolls performance. The failure of Rolls-Royce wasnt the cause nor was the man who picked the engine. Rolls-Royce offered the best deal, the best engine. We could evaluate the design and engineering but we were novices at international contracting. All of the price and payment clauses went out the window. They were as real as the magicians deck of cards. We were used to being at the edge of technology. Our country doesnt have the fastest and best in the air by being timid. Whats a common thread of this effort? Delays, budget overruns, redesigns, etc. A commercial plane doesnt stretch the technical boundary, its tried and true. After everything that happened, the fault has to lie with management, not one person in management but management. At Lockheed everyone wanted a seat at the table. Those at the table were different. They looked around and connected with each other because of the ivy league school they graduated from. They were the officers and deserved special treatment. They were part of the network. Its much like school. You quickly learn that classroom performance has a big influence on your grade. It starts in the first grade and continues well into university. It was prevalent at Lockheed. The problem was that in school you had the teacher correcting and demanding proof. At Lockheed, rarely was evidence demanded. Rarely did management question the facts. As the qualified and experienced retired, senior management had little feedback. The up and comer was the one first at the meeting and with a chair at the table. No one asked for his qualifications or where were the facts. A salesman would go on and on as to how hard it was. He added up the many days he was out of the country. No one asked him to name someone at the airline that he knew. Bottom line read the book. Its a part of history and a lesson in Management 101.
The End of an Era was written shortly after my retirement from Lockheed. I felt strongly about the events during the L-1011 years. The demise of the program left me without a job. I guess that in some ways I resented that. I wanted to blame the programs failure on somebody. My first draft did just that. I did point fingers. I wrote about what I felt was incompetence. Luckily, I threw my first version out. My next version began with reciting the facts, as I knew them. I had been there when decisions were made. I had been a part of the management team. Or, maybe I hadnt. Dan Haughton ran the show. He frequently shuffled people in and out of the program. In some sense, I felt like an observer. I stood to the side as this went on. Everything about Lockheed was attuned to DOD business. Lockheed was at the forefront of technical advances. We knew how to fly faster, higher, and with the largest payload. We knew little if anything about commercial business. Dont get me wrong, we knew how to design and build a commercial airplane. We just didnt know how to relate that to customers and customer satisfaction. Airlines bought the L-1011 because it was the best one out there and in spite of Lockheed. My original title was My Story of the L-1011. It wasnt until I read that first complete manuscript that I realized I was talking about the end of an era. Lockheed and corporate America were experiencing the birth of the modern manager, the MBA. The manager of the engineering division didnt need to know engineering, he had an MBA. The lack of commercial experience, the exodus of the knowledgeable manager, and the birth of the MBA, with his network, spelled nothing but disaster. I have been criticized for ignoring the engineering aspects of the L-1011. The strongest criticism is that I missed the boat. I didnt cite the RB211s failure. Rolls-Royce inability to achieve the necessary thrust was the downfall of the L-1011. Rolls-Royce failed, went bankrupt, but Lockheed management failed in being ill prepared for the event. Dan Haughton rolled the dice and put the program at risk of the Roll-Royce failure. In the early stages of the planes development Dan eliminated the ability to fly with a GE or Pratt engine. Sure, it saved money but it also put the program completely at risk of Rolls performance. The failure of Rolls-Royce wasnt the cause nor was the man who picked the engine. Rolls-Royce offered the best deal, the best engine. We could evaluate the design and engineering but we were novices at international contracting. All of the price and payment clauses went out the window. They were as real as the magicians deck of cards. We were used to being at the edge of technology. Our country doesnt have the fastest and best in the air by being timid. Whats a common thread of this effort? Delays, budget overruns, redesigns, etc. A commercial plane doesnt stretch the technical boundary, its tried and true. After everything that happened, the fault has to lie with management, not one person in management but management. At Lockheed everyone wanted a seat at the table. Those at the table were different. They looked around and connected with each other because of the ivy league school they graduated from. They were the officers and deserved special treatment. They were part of the network. Its much like school. You quickly learn that classroom performance has a big influence on your grade. It starts in the first grade and continues well into university. It was prevalent at Lockheed. The problem was that in school you had the teacher correcting and demanding proof. At Lockheed, rarely was evidence demanded. Rarely did management question the facts. As the qualified and experienced retired, senior management had little feedback. The up and comer was the one first at the meeting and with a chair at the table. No one asked for his qualifications or where were the facts. A salesman would go on and on as to how hard it was. He added up the many days he was out of the country. No one asked him to name someone at the airline that he knew. Bottom line read the book. Its a part of history and a lesson in Management 101.
