The Impact Of An Operational Void: The Strategic Hamlet Program, 1961-1963

Nonfiction, History, Military, Vietnam War, Asian, United States
Cover of the book The Impact Of An Operational Void: The Strategic Hamlet Program, 1961-1963 by Major Gregory B. Conover, Normanby Press
View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart
Author: Major Gregory B. Conover ISBN: 9781786250063
Publisher: Normanby Press Publication: November 6, 2015
Imprint: Normanby Press Language: English
Author: Major Gregory B. Conover
ISBN: 9781786250063
Publisher: Normanby Press
Publication: November 6, 2015
Imprint: Normanby Press
Language: English

The Vietnam conflict spread dissension into every corner of our political and cultural environment and shattered the foreign policy consensus that had guided US relations since World War II. The initial combined effort of the United States and South Vietnam to defeat the insurgency was the Strategic Hamlet Program. This monograph argues that the Strategic Hamlet Program failed due to the absence of an operational link between strategic concept and tactical execution.

The monograph initially reviews the strategic context that existed in South Vietnam during the critical period of 1961-1963, that window in time in which the United States first became an active and full-fledged ally of the South Vietnamese. This review establishes that the two partners held very different perspectives on the conflict and had different objectives in mind when they entered into the Strategic Hamlet Program as a combined effort.

The author identifies four principal lessons. First, one should avoid attempting to accomplish significant political or social reforms while simultaneously trying to conduct a major counter insurgency operation. Second, for a program to be effective, there is an absolute requirement to establish an operational link between strategic concept and tactical execution. Third, there exists an inherent “influence dilemma” that every third party must face in a counter insurgency effort. Finally, every insurgency/counterinsurgency is unique and must be and judged on its own merits.

The monograph concludes by arguing that the strategic hamlet approach does have utility as a general counterinsurgency strategy in certain types of situations and suggests encadrement as a means for attaining the critical all-requirement for local security in such an effort.

View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart

The Vietnam conflict spread dissension into every corner of our political and cultural environment and shattered the foreign policy consensus that had guided US relations since World War II. The initial combined effort of the United States and South Vietnam to defeat the insurgency was the Strategic Hamlet Program. This monograph argues that the Strategic Hamlet Program failed due to the absence of an operational link between strategic concept and tactical execution.

The monograph initially reviews the strategic context that existed in South Vietnam during the critical period of 1961-1963, that window in time in which the United States first became an active and full-fledged ally of the South Vietnamese. This review establishes that the two partners held very different perspectives on the conflict and had different objectives in mind when they entered into the Strategic Hamlet Program as a combined effort.

The author identifies four principal lessons. First, one should avoid attempting to accomplish significant political or social reforms while simultaneously trying to conduct a major counter insurgency operation. Second, for a program to be effective, there is an absolute requirement to establish an operational link between strategic concept and tactical execution. Third, there exists an inherent “influence dilemma” that every third party must face in a counter insurgency effort. Finally, every insurgency/counterinsurgency is unique and must be and judged on its own merits.

The monograph concludes by arguing that the strategic hamlet approach does have utility as a general counterinsurgency strategy in certain types of situations and suggests encadrement as a means for attaining the critical all-requirement for local security in such an effort.

More books from Normanby Press

Cover of the book Smoke Over Birkenau [Illustrated Edition] by Major Gregory B. Conover
Cover of the book Air Power And The Fight For Khe Sanh [Illustrated Edition] by Major Gregory B. Conover
Cover of the book Recollections Of A Military Life [Illustrated Edition] by Major Gregory B. Conover
Cover of the book Life and Correspondence of Field Marshal Sir John Burgoyne, Bart. — Vol. II by Major Gregory B. Conover
Cover of the book The Return of the Dark Invader by Major Gregory B. Conover
Cover of the book Advice And Support: The Final Years 1965-1973 [Illustrated Edition] by Major Gregory B. Conover
Cover of the book The Splendid Century by Major Gregory B. Conover
Cover of the book Major General George Crook’s Use Of Counterinsurgency Compound Warfare During The Great Sioux War Of 1876-77 by Major Gregory B. Conover
Cover of the book The Price Of Courage by Major Gregory B. Conover
Cover of the book A Biography Of Warren Hastings by Major Gregory B. Conover
Cover of the book Fight For The Flags [Illustrated Edition] by Major Gregory B. Conover
Cover of the book Forty-One Years In India - From Subaltern To Commander-In-Chief [Illustrated Edition] by Major Gregory B. Conover
Cover of the book The Swiss Without Halos by Major Gregory B. Conover
Cover of the book Battles of the Boer War by Major Gregory B. Conover
Cover of the book A History Of The British Army – Vol. V – (1803-1807) by Major Gregory B. Conover
We use our own "cookies" and third party cookies to improve services and to see statistical information. By using this website, you agree to our Privacy Policy