| Author: | James Harden Wood | ISBN: | 9781465604569 |
| Publisher: | Library of Alexandria | Publication: | March 8, 2015 |
| Imprint: | Language: | English |
| Author: | James Harden Wood |
| ISBN: | 9781465604569 |
| Publisher: | Library of Alexandria |
| Publication: | March 8, 2015 |
| Imprint: | |
| Language: | English |
ABOUT this time the Federals made demonstration at Kelley's Ford, some miles above Fredericksburg. The two armies had been lying on opposite sides of this river, since the battle of Fredericksburg in December. Gen. Joe Hooker was now in command of the Federal army, and on the 28th of April a small part of his army crossed the river a little below Fredericksburg, thus indicating an intended advance from that direction. This, however, as were other demonstrations, was for the purpose of drawing attention from his real course of approach, which soon developed to be by way of the United States and other fords of the Rappahannock, fifteen and twenty miles above Fredericksburg, where he crossed his army and was bearing down by way of Chancellorsville upon Lee's left and rear. Here the Federals encountered Anderson's and McLaw's divisions, and thinking it an advance by Lee took a formidable defensive position, extending his lines from the Furnace and Tabernacle Church to Chancellorsville, thence behind Mineral Spring Run to and beyond the old Mine Road. This strong position and the superior numbers of the Federals put the consideration of a front attack out of the question, but the emergency was great and had to be met; but how? Longstreet's corps was away and the inadequacy of numbers was great and conditions serious. But Jackson, as usual, cut the gordian knot. In answer to the query of Lee, as to what should be done, he replied, "Outflank them." This was accepted as the best solution, and Jackson was entrusted with this important task. On the morning of May 1st he set out with his old division commanded by General Colston, A. P. Hill's and Rodes' divisions. This was a great risk for Lee to divide his army in the front of his advancing antagonist for this great flank movement. It was contrary to the principles of strategy for Jackson to take his corps of 26,000 men, leaving Lee with about 18,000 men an easy prey, to be crushed by Hooker, who could then turn upon Jackson with his entire army; but Hooker did not know conditions or did not avail of the opportunity thus presented. He also certainly blundered in failing to properly protect his right wing, but for this failure of Hooker success would hardly have attended Jackson's move. The disparity in numbers and position in favor of the Federals was too great.
ABOUT this time the Federals made demonstration at Kelley's Ford, some miles above Fredericksburg. The two armies had been lying on opposite sides of this river, since the battle of Fredericksburg in December. Gen. Joe Hooker was now in command of the Federal army, and on the 28th of April a small part of his army crossed the river a little below Fredericksburg, thus indicating an intended advance from that direction. This, however, as were other demonstrations, was for the purpose of drawing attention from his real course of approach, which soon developed to be by way of the United States and other fords of the Rappahannock, fifteen and twenty miles above Fredericksburg, where he crossed his army and was bearing down by way of Chancellorsville upon Lee's left and rear. Here the Federals encountered Anderson's and McLaw's divisions, and thinking it an advance by Lee took a formidable defensive position, extending his lines from the Furnace and Tabernacle Church to Chancellorsville, thence behind Mineral Spring Run to and beyond the old Mine Road. This strong position and the superior numbers of the Federals put the consideration of a front attack out of the question, but the emergency was great and had to be met; but how? Longstreet's corps was away and the inadequacy of numbers was great and conditions serious. But Jackson, as usual, cut the gordian knot. In answer to the query of Lee, as to what should be done, he replied, "Outflank them." This was accepted as the best solution, and Jackson was entrusted with this important task. On the morning of May 1st he set out with his old division commanded by General Colston, A. P. Hill's and Rodes' divisions. This was a great risk for Lee to divide his army in the front of his advancing antagonist for this great flank movement. It was contrary to the principles of strategy for Jackson to take his corps of 26,000 men, leaving Lee with about 18,000 men an easy prey, to be crushed by Hooker, who could then turn upon Jackson with his entire army; but Hooker did not know conditions or did not avail of the opportunity thus presented. He also certainly blundered in failing to properly protect his right wing, but for this failure of Hooker success would hardly have attended Jackson's move. The disparity in numbers and position in favor of the Federals was too great.
