Triangles, Symbols, and Constraints

The United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China, 1963-1969

Nonfiction, History, Asian, Former Soviet Republics, China, Americas, United States
Cover of the book Triangles, Symbols, and Constraints by Charles Dobbs, UPA
View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart
Author: Charles Dobbs ISBN: 9780761850007
Publisher: UPA Publication: January 25, 2010
Imprint: UPA Language: English
Author: Charles Dobbs
ISBN: 9780761850007
Publisher: UPA
Publication: January 25, 2010
Imprint: UPA
Language: English

In his five-plus years as president of the United States, Lyndon Johnson witnessed dramatic power struggles within and between the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and the United States of America. New Soviet leaders were determined to build Soviet power and extend Soviet influence. Mao's revolutionary ideology so dominated China that there were few levers to move Sino-American relations ahead. Johnson wanted to ease Cold War tensions by reaching a range of agreements with the Soviet Union on nuclear weapons and establishing relations with the People's Republic of China in order to end its isolation in the world community. However, multiple events frustrated Johnson's good intentions. The Soviet leadership that overthrew Nikita Khrushchev was committed to expanding its military might before negotiating with Washington; it also began focusing more and more on the worsening Sino-Soviet split. Mao Zedong entered into the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, and China seemed to devour itself. Meanwhile, the Vietnam War made negotiations among all three great powers more difficult, limiting room to maneuver. But Johnson persevered, and by 1968 the apparent American retreat symbolized by the North Korean seizure of the USS Pueblo and the Communist Tet Offensive in Vietnam, along with the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, seemed to change the construct between the great powers. Beijing, emerging from the worst of the Cultural Revolution, increasingly feared Soviet intentions, and Moscow wanted to prevent a Sino-American rapprochement. Although Johnson did not achieve his lofty goals, he created the pre-conditions that Richard Nixon later harvested for the dZtente with Moscow and rapprochement with Beijing. Johnson's best intentions fell prey to triangles, symbols, and constraints.

View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart

In his five-plus years as president of the United States, Lyndon Johnson witnessed dramatic power struggles within and between the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and the United States of America. New Soviet leaders were determined to build Soviet power and extend Soviet influence. Mao's revolutionary ideology so dominated China that there were few levers to move Sino-American relations ahead. Johnson wanted to ease Cold War tensions by reaching a range of agreements with the Soviet Union on nuclear weapons and establishing relations with the People's Republic of China in order to end its isolation in the world community. However, multiple events frustrated Johnson's good intentions. The Soviet leadership that overthrew Nikita Khrushchev was committed to expanding its military might before negotiating with Washington; it also began focusing more and more on the worsening Sino-Soviet split. Mao Zedong entered into the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, and China seemed to devour itself. Meanwhile, the Vietnam War made negotiations among all three great powers more difficult, limiting room to maneuver. But Johnson persevered, and by 1968 the apparent American retreat symbolized by the North Korean seizure of the USS Pueblo and the Communist Tet Offensive in Vietnam, along with the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, seemed to change the construct between the great powers. Beijing, emerging from the worst of the Cultural Revolution, increasingly feared Soviet intentions, and Moscow wanted to prevent a Sino-American rapprochement. Although Johnson did not achieve his lofty goals, he created the pre-conditions that Richard Nixon later harvested for the dZtente with Moscow and rapprochement with Beijing. Johnson's best intentions fell prey to triangles, symbols, and constraints.

More books from UPA

Cover of the book Immigration Reform by Charles Dobbs
Cover of the book Forgotten Reformer by Charles Dobbs
Cover of the book Nigeria's Democratic Experience in the Fourth Republic since 1999 by Charles Dobbs
Cover of the book A Handbook of Statistics and Quantitative Analysis for Educational Leadership by Charles Dobbs
Cover of the book Embodied Collective Memory by Charles Dobbs
Cover of the book Food for the Soul by Charles Dobbs
Cover of the book OK, I’ve Signed Up For Statistics. Now What? by Charles Dobbs
Cover of the book Klee as in Clay by Charles Dobbs
Cover of the book Michael Servetus, Heartfelt by Charles Dobbs
Cover of the book Israel, Palestine, & the Quest for Middle East Peace by Charles Dobbs
Cover of the book Sorting Africa's Developmental Puzzle by Charles Dobbs
Cover of the book School Social Work Services in Federally Funded Programs by Charles Dobbs
Cover of the book Hidden Threads by Charles Dobbs
Cover of the book Nazi Ideology by Charles Dobbs
Cover of the book Japanese Grammar by Charles Dobbs
We use our own "cookies" and third party cookies to improve services and to see statistical information. By using this website, you agree to our Privacy Policy