Battlefield Air Interdiction In The 1973 Middle East War And Its Significance To NATO Air Operations

Nonfiction, History, Middle East, Israel, Military
Cover of the book Battlefield Air Interdiction In The 1973 Middle East War And Its Significance To NATO Air Operations by Major Bruce A. Brant, Tannenberg Publishing
View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart
Author: Major Bruce A. Brant ISBN: 9781782899679
Publisher: Tannenberg Publishing Publication: November 6, 2015
Imprint: Tannenberg Publishing Language: English
Author: Major Bruce A. Brant
ISBN: 9781782899679
Publisher: Tannenberg Publishing
Publication: November 6, 2015
Imprint: Tannenberg Publishing
Language: English

This study is a historical analysis of battlefield air interdiction during the 1973 Middle East War. Its purpose is to draw conclusions, based on the historical findings, about the best way to employ BAI in the air land battle. Although the conclusions come from a Middle East War over ten years ago, they are examined in terms of the NATO environment.

The tactical and technological developments of both Arab and Israeli air forces during the years 1967-1973 are examined in order to explain how both sides arrived at the doctrine they employed in the 1973 War. The Arabs established an intensive air defense network to deny the Israelis their strongest and most flexible weapons system. The Israelis believed that their Air Force would destroy Arab ground forces as it did in 1967. The confrontation of both doctrines had significant implications for the ground forces particularly the relative value assigned close air support and battlefield air interdiction.

The study concludes that close air support is not the best use of air assets in a high density air defense environment. Battlefield air interdiction is more effective to the operational ground commander. Localized control of air defense systems is needed to allow the use of air to ground assets. The final conclusion is that suppression of enemy air defense systems is a joint service responsibility.

View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart

This study is a historical analysis of battlefield air interdiction during the 1973 Middle East War. Its purpose is to draw conclusions, based on the historical findings, about the best way to employ BAI in the air land battle. Although the conclusions come from a Middle East War over ten years ago, they are examined in terms of the NATO environment.

The tactical and technological developments of both Arab and Israeli air forces during the years 1967-1973 are examined in order to explain how both sides arrived at the doctrine they employed in the 1973 War. The Arabs established an intensive air defense network to deny the Israelis their strongest and most flexible weapons system. The Israelis believed that their Air Force would destroy Arab ground forces as it did in 1967. The confrontation of both doctrines had significant implications for the ground forces particularly the relative value assigned close air support and battlefield air interdiction.

The study concludes that close air support is not the best use of air assets in a high density air defense environment. Battlefield air interdiction is more effective to the operational ground commander. Localized control of air defense systems is needed to allow the use of air to ground assets. The final conclusion is that suppression of enemy air defense systems is a joint service responsibility.

More books from Tannenberg Publishing

Cover of the book The Crack in the Picture Window by Major Bruce A. Brant
Cover of the book Air Superiority Battle In The Middle East, 1967-1973 by Major Bruce A. Brant
Cover of the book Determination And Effectiveness Of Wwii Strategic Bombing Strategy by Major Bruce A. Brant
Cover of the book Pugnax The Gladiator by Major Bruce A. Brant
Cover of the book Israeli Combined Arms Employment: Um Katef, 1967 & Suez Canal, 1973 by Major Bruce A. Brant
Cover of the book Significance Of The Human Being As An Element In An Information System: by Major Bruce A. Brant
Cover of the book View From The Air by Major Bruce A. Brant
Cover of the book 125th MP Bn Unit Missions by Major Bruce A. Brant
Cover of the book Analysis Of The Six Day War, June 1967 by Major Bruce A. Brant
Cover of the book Key To The Sinai: The Battles For Abu Agelia In The 1956 And 1967 Arab Israeli Wars [Illustrated Edition] by Major Bruce A. Brant
Cover of the book $1.97-“The Sledgehammer.” by Major Bruce A. Brant
Cover of the book The U.S. Army Airborne Division, 1942 To 1945: Concept, Combat, And Evolution by Major Bruce A. Brant
Cover of the book Battle Command In The Storm: Lieutenant General Franks And VII Corps by Major Bruce A. Brant
Cover of the book Transport Helicopters: The Achilles Heel Of Maneuver Warfare by Major Bruce A. Brant
Cover of the book Ensuring The Continued Relevance Of Long Range Surveillance Units by Major Bruce A. Brant
We use our own "cookies" and third party cookies to improve services and to see statistical information. By using this website, you agree to our Privacy Policy