Deterrence and Saddam Hussein: Lessons from the 1990-1991 Gulf War - Limits of Deterrence, Cold War Theory, Bush versus Saddam Hussein, Chemical and Biological Weapons, Kuwait Invasion, Desert Storm
Nonfiction, History, Middle East, Persian Gulf War, Military, Strategy
| Author: | Progressive Management | ISBN: | 9781310111198 |
| Publisher: | Progressive Management | Publication: | January 13, 2016 |
| Imprint: | Smashwords Edition | Language: | English |
| Author: | Progressive Management |
| ISBN: | 9781310111198 |
| Publisher: | Progressive Management |
| Publication: | January 13, 2016 |
| Imprint: | Smashwords Edition |
| Language: | English |
Professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction, this unique publication presents an examination of President Saddam Hussein of Iraq and President George H.W. Bush of the United States and their respective governments' attempts to deter one another in the period just before Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990 and through the subsequent Gulf conflict that ended in February 1991. On the United States side of this deterrence effort, one must also include the deterrent effect of U.S. coalition partners in the crisis and war. In this analysis we look at a series of deterrence questions:
1. What are the limits of deterrence theory? Are the clearly stronger military powers able to deter significantly weaker powers all or most of the time?
2. What are the elements of deterrence strategy that Western strategists developed during the Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union?
3. Why was Saddam Hussein not deterred from ordering the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990?
4. Why was Saddam Hussein not deterred from facing vastly superior and coalition forces assembled to force him out of Kuwait between August 1990 and January 1991?
5. Why were the United States and the coalition forces not deterred by Iraq from initiating combat in January 1991?
6. Why did Saddam Hussein not resort to use of his chemical and biological weapons in the war as an equalizer against more powerful coalition forces?
7. Why during this conflict was Saddam Hussein not deterred from attacking Israel, a state with a nuclear arsenal?
8. Why did the United States and the coalition not pursue Iraqi forces into their country and end the Saddam Hussein regime in Baghdad? Was the United States deterred from pursuing the war all the way to Baghdad by the residual Iraqi military capability?
9. Was the United States deterred from the use of nuclear weapons in the war by the threat of Iraqi retaliation with chemical and/or biological weapons?
10. What conclusions and lessons can be extracted from this conflict regarding deterrence as a strategy for future crises?
Professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction, this unique publication presents an examination of President Saddam Hussein of Iraq and President George H.W. Bush of the United States and their respective governments' attempts to deter one another in the period just before Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990 and through the subsequent Gulf conflict that ended in February 1991. On the United States side of this deterrence effort, one must also include the deterrent effect of U.S. coalition partners in the crisis and war. In this analysis we look at a series of deterrence questions:
1. What are the limits of deterrence theory? Are the clearly stronger military powers able to deter significantly weaker powers all or most of the time?
2. What are the elements of deterrence strategy that Western strategists developed during the Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union?
3. Why was Saddam Hussein not deterred from ordering the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990?
4. Why was Saddam Hussein not deterred from facing vastly superior and coalition forces assembled to force him out of Kuwait between August 1990 and January 1991?
5. Why were the United States and the coalition forces not deterred by Iraq from initiating combat in January 1991?
6. Why did Saddam Hussein not resort to use of his chemical and biological weapons in the war as an equalizer against more powerful coalition forces?
7. Why during this conflict was Saddam Hussein not deterred from attacking Israel, a state with a nuclear arsenal?
8. Why did the United States and the coalition not pursue Iraqi forces into their country and end the Saddam Hussein regime in Baghdad? Was the United States deterred from pursuing the war all the way to Baghdad by the residual Iraqi military capability?
9. Was the United States deterred from the use of nuclear weapons in the war by the threat of Iraqi retaliation with chemical and/or biological weapons?
10. What conclusions and lessons can be extracted from this conflict regarding deterrence as a strategy for future crises?
