Deterrence vs. Assurance: The U.S. Naval Presence in the Persian Gulf - Strategy about Iranian Aggression in Strait of Hormuz, Role of Saudi Arabia, Warship Deterrence May Be Misguided and Unnecessary
Nonfiction, History, Military, Naval, Middle East
| Author: | Progressive Management | ISBN: | 9780463521649 |
| Publisher: | Progressive Management | Publication: | June 12, 2018 |
| Imprint: | Smashwords Edition | Language: | English |
| Author: | Progressive Management |
| ISBN: | 9780463521649 |
| Publisher: | Progressive Management |
| Publication: | June 12, 2018 |
| Imprint: | Smashwords Edition |
| Language: | English |
This important 2018 report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction.
This study examines the U.S. Navy's current strategy in the Persian Gulf and assesses which aspect of that strategy—deterrence or assurance—makes a more significant contribution to regional stability in the greater Middle East region. This research draws from two cases: the Navy's deterrence-based strategy surrounding Iranian aggression toward the Strait of Hormuz and the Navy's assurance-based strategy using Saudi Arabia as an example. The findings indicate that Iran poses little threat to the Strait of Hormuz for various economic and military reasons, suggesting that perhaps the Navy's policy of deterring Iran through the presence of warships is misguided and unnecessary. Alternatively, providing assurance to Saudi Arabia seems to have a positive impact on regional stability. If the Navy seeks to use its warships as a stabilizing force in the region, it should restructure its strategy and employ ships in ways that provide assurance, not deterrence.
I. INTRODUCTION * A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION * B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION * C. LITERATURE REVIEW * 1. Deterrence * 2. Assurance * 3. Literature Review Conclusion * D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESIS * 1. First Hypothesis * 2. Second Hypothesis * 3. Third Hypothesis * E. RESEARCH DESIGN * II. IRANIAN THREATS TOWARD STRAIT OF HORMUZ * A. HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND * 1. 1953 Coup d'etat * 2. 1979 Iranian Revolution and Anti-Western Sentiment * B. THREATS IN THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ * 1. U.S. Response * 2. Iran's Actions * III. ALTERNATE EXPLANATIONS * A. ECONOMIC * 1. Oil Exports * 2. Other Exports * 3. Imports * B. POLITICAL * 1. International Pressure * 2. Nuclear Program * C. MILITARY * 1. Feasibility * 2. International Military Response * IV. ASSURANCE AND SAUDI ARABIA * A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND POLITICAL CONTEXT * B. SOURCES OF ASSURANCE * 1. Bilateral Agreements and Arms Sales * 2. Naval Exercises and Partnerships * 3. Missile Defense * V. BENEFITS OF ASSURANCE IN SAUDI ARABIA * A. MILITARY BUILDUP AND SECURITY DILEMMA * B. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION * VI. CONCLUSIONS * A. FINDINGS * 1. Deterrence * 2. Assurance * B. IMPLICATIONS
This important 2018 report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction.
This study examines the U.S. Navy's current strategy in the Persian Gulf and assesses which aspect of that strategy—deterrence or assurance—makes a more significant contribution to regional stability in the greater Middle East region. This research draws from two cases: the Navy's deterrence-based strategy surrounding Iranian aggression toward the Strait of Hormuz and the Navy's assurance-based strategy using Saudi Arabia as an example. The findings indicate that Iran poses little threat to the Strait of Hormuz for various economic and military reasons, suggesting that perhaps the Navy's policy of deterring Iran through the presence of warships is misguided and unnecessary. Alternatively, providing assurance to Saudi Arabia seems to have a positive impact on regional stability. If the Navy seeks to use its warships as a stabilizing force in the region, it should restructure its strategy and employ ships in ways that provide assurance, not deterrence.
I. INTRODUCTION * A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION * B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION * C. LITERATURE REVIEW * 1. Deterrence * 2. Assurance * 3. Literature Review Conclusion * D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESIS * 1. First Hypothesis * 2. Second Hypothesis * 3. Third Hypothesis * E. RESEARCH DESIGN * II. IRANIAN THREATS TOWARD STRAIT OF HORMUZ * A. HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND * 1. 1953 Coup d'etat * 2. 1979 Iranian Revolution and Anti-Western Sentiment * B. THREATS IN THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ * 1. U.S. Response * 2. Iran's Actions * III. ALTERNATE EXPLANATIONS * A. ECONOMIC * 1. Oil Exports * 2. Other Exports * 3. Imports * B. POLITICAL * 1. International Pressure * 2. Nuclear Program * C. MILITARY * 1. Feasibility * 2. International Military Response * IV. ASSURANCE AND SAUDI ARABIA * A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND POLITICAL CONTEXT * B. SOURCES OF ASSURANCE * 1. Bilateral Agreements and Arms Sales * 2. Naval Exercises and Partnerships * 3. Missile Defense * V. BENEFITS OF ASSURANCE IN SAUDI ARABIA * A. MILITARY BUILDUP AND SECURITY DILEMMA * B. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION * VI. CONCLUSIONS * A. FINDINGS * 1. Deterrence * 2. Assurance * B. IMPLICATIONS
