Essential Guide to the Southern Campaign of the American Revolution: Insurgency, Greene's Compound Warfare, Militias, Lessons from the British Defeat Combating Colonial Hybrid Warfare, Yorktown
Nonfiction, History, Americas, United States, Revolutionary Period (1775-1800), Military
| Author: | Progressive Management | ISBN: | 9781310690761 |
| Publisher: | Progressive Management | Publication: | May 18, 2016 |
| Imprint: | Smashwords Edition | Language: | English |
| Author: | Progressive Management |
| ISBN: | 9781310690761 |
| Publisher: | Progressive Management |
| Publication: | May 18, 2016 |
| Imprint: | Smashwords Edition |
| Language: | English |
Professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction, this unique book reproduces nine important government documents, reports, and studies dealing with the Southern Campaign of the American Revolution. The books are:
The Southern Campaign of the American Revolution: A Comparative Analysis of British and American Approaches * The Southern Campaign of the American Revolution: The American Insurgency from 1780 to 1782 * Nathanael Greene's Implementation of Compound Warfare During the Southern Campaign of the American Revolution * Militias in Military Doctrine: Implications from the Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution 1779-1781 * Operational Leadership of Nathanael Greene During the Southern Campaign of 1780-1781 * The British Southern Campaign 1778-1781: The Impact of Strategic Level Assessments and Assumptions on British Decision Making * Lessons From the British Defeat Combating Colonial Hybrid Warfare in the 1781 Southern Theater of Operations * Understanding British Strategic Failure in America: 1780-1783 * British Intelligence Operations as They Relate to Britain's Defeat At Yorktown, 1781
In 1779 the British realized that the revolution in the American colonies was stalemated. After their shocking defeat at Saratoga, the British needed to regain momentum. Based on the assumption that there was greater loyalist support in the Carolinas, General Sir Henry Clinton launched the British Southern Campaign. After Clinton enjoyed a decisive victory with the seizure of Charleston in May 1780, Cornwallis assumed command of the Southern Department. Like Clinton, Cornwallis saw early success—a decisive victory at Camden-- and assumed their new strategy was working. However, after Camden and the relief of General Horatio Gates, a new American commander, Nathanael Greene, took charge of the American forces in the South. Through his superior mission analysis and planning abilities, Greene was able to turn the tide in the South. Greene recognized the realities of the operational environment and effectively integrated conventional and partisan forces, thereby leading an effective hybrid form of warfare. The failure of the British Southern Campaign was an example of mission planning based on faulty assumptions. When the initial assumptions failed, the operation encountered challenges which led to more failures in the decision making process. The failed campaign eventually led to Cornwallis's surrender at Yorktown and was a catalyst for the British to concede defeat. By analyzing the British Southern Campaign, we can learn valuable lessons for planning and executing a counter insurgency campaign. On the other hand, by examining the operation designed and executed by Greene, we can learn the value of detailed logistical planning and the integration of all viable tactics and forces in an operation.
Professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction, this unique book reproduces nine important government documents, reports, and studies dealing with the Southern Campaign of the American Revolution. The books are:
The Southern Campaign of the American Revolution: A Comparative Analysis of British and American Approaches * The Southern Campaign of the American Revolution: The American Insurgency from 1780 to 1782 * Nathanael Greene's Implementation of Compound Warfare During the Southern Campaign of the American Revolution * Militias in Military Doctrine: Implications from the Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution 1779-1781 * Operational Leadership of Nathanael Greene During the Southern Campaign of 1780-1781 * The British Southern Campaign 1778-1781: The Impact of Strategic Level Assessments and Assumptions on British Decision Making * Lessons From the British Defeat Combating Colonial Hybrid Warfare in the 1781 Southern Theater of Operations * Understanding British Strategic Failure in America: 1780-1783 * British Intelligence Operations as They Relate to Britain's Defeat At Yorktown, 1781
In 1779 the British realized that the revolution in the American colonies was stalemated. After their shocking defeat at Saratoga, the British needed to regain momentum. Based on the assumption that there was greater loyalist support in the Carolinas, General Sir Henry Clinton launched the British Southern Campaign. After Clinton enjoyed a decisive victory with the seizure of Charleston in May 1780, Cornwallis assumed command of the Southern Department. Like Clinton, Cornwallis saw early success—a decisive victory at Camden-- and assumed their new strategy was working. However, after Camden and the relief of General Horatio Gates, a new American commander, Nathanael Greene, took charge of the American forces in the South. Through his superior mission analysis and planning abilities, Greene was able to turn the tide in the South. Greene recognized the realities of the operational environment and effectively integrated conventional and partisan forces, thereby leading an effective hybrid form of warfare. The failure of the British Southern Campaign was an example of mission planning based on faulty assumptions. When the initial assumptions failed, the operation encountered challenges which led to more failures in the decision making process. The failed campaign eventually led to Cornwallis's surrender at Yorktown and was a catalyst for the British to concede defeat. By analyzing the British Southern Campaign, we can learn valuable lessons for planning and executing a counter insurgency campaign. On the other hand, by examining the operation designed and executed by Greene, we can learn the value of detailed logistical planning and the integration of all viable tactics and forces in an operation.
