Great American Generals: Colin Luther Powell - Early Years, Strategic Leadership, Willpower, Persian Gulf War, Political Foot Soldier, The Powell Doctrine, Life, Career, Awards, Saigon to Baghdad
Nonfiction, History, Middle East, Persian Gulf War, Military, United States
| Author: | Progressive Management | ISBN: | 9781310773853 |
| Publisher: | Progressive Management | Publication: | December 6, 2015 |
| Imprint: | Smashwords Edition | Language: | English |
| Author: | Progressive Management |
| ISBN: | 9781310773853 |
| Publisher: | Progressive Management |
| Publication: | December 6, 2015 |
| Imprint: | Smashwords Edition |
| Language: | English |
This is a comprehensive compilation of military reports, documents, and academic research papers about the life and career of Colin Powell, who served as Secretary of State and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.. These documents are professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction.
Contents: Strategic Leadership Assessment of Colin L. Powell * Willpower: A Historical Study of an Influential Leadership Attribute * Leadership and Parochialism - An Enduring Reality? * Defining Victory: Three Case Studies of Strategic Guidance and Decision Making * Strategic Leadership Competency Development: A Comparison of Generals Zinni and Powell * Political Foot-Soldier: Colin Powell's Interagency Campaign For The "Base Force" * Weinberger-Powell and Transformation: Perceptions of American Power From the Fall of Saigon to the Fall of Baghdad * Operation ALLIED FORCE and the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine: An Analysis * Powell's Leadership Principles - Time for State Department to Revisit * Mentorship: Strategically Leveling the Playing Field for African American Officers * From Theory To Practice: The Powell Doctrine * Prophets or Praetorians? The Uptonian Paradox and the Powell Corollary * Commitment of Force: Employing Force as an Instrument of Power * Potential Impacts of a Politicized U.S. Officer Corps * Nomination of Colin L. Powell to be Secretary Of State * Excerpt from The Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff - 1949-2012
General Colin L. Powell, USA, came to the chairmanship on 1 October 1989 determined to make full use of the Chairman's expanded authority. He had the advantage of being the first Chairman to serve his entire tenure under the Goldwater-Nichols Act. In addition, his extensive experience at the highest levels of government, his resulting close relationship with President George H. W. Bush and Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, and — during the last years of his tenure—the public prominence which he attained during the Persian Gulf War gave him considerable latitude in the exercise of the authority granted the Chairman under Goldwater-Nichols. Powell had a clear idea of what he wished to accomplish. As Secretary Weinberger's Military Assistant and President Reagan's National Security Adviser, he had found that the military advice produced by the corporate JCS system frequently did not meet policymakers' needs because it was often untimely and diluted. He was determined that that would not happen during his tenure. Foreseeing the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, he believed that it was his responsibility both to initiate a reorientation of military strategy in response to the changed world situation and to provide programming guidance to the services for a reduced force structure. Although he would have preferred having the Chiefs' support for his ideas, he was willing to proceed without it. When they did not endorse his views on strategy and force structure, he won the support of Secretary Cheney and President Bush for his proposals. Mindful of the operational and command prerogatives of the CINCs, Powell nevertheless exerted considerable influence on operations. During planning for the Panama operation in 1989 and the Persian Gulf War in 1990-1991, he pressed civilian leaders to identify national interests, examine all options, and define objectives before using military force. Once the decision to attack had been made, he played a major role in convincing the Bush administration to apply overwhelming force to achieve rapid success at low cost.
This is a comprehensive compilation of military reports, documents, and academic research papers about the life and career of Colin Powell, who served as Secretary of State and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.. These documents are professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction.
Contents: Strategic Leadership Assessment of Colin L. Powell * Willpower: A Historical Study of an Influential Leadership Attribute * Leadership and Parochialism - An Enduring Reality? * Defining Victory: Three Case Studies of Strategic Guidance and Decision Making * Strategic Leadership Competency Development: A Comparison of Generals Zinni and Powell * Political Foot-Soldier: Colin Powell's Interagency Campaign For The "Base Force" * Weinberger-Powell and Transformation: Perceptions of American Power From the Fall of Saigon to the Fall of Baghdad * Operation ALLIED FORCE and the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine: An Analysis * Powell's Leadership Principles - Time for State Department to Revisit * Mentorship: Strategically Leveling the Playing Field for African American Officers * From Theory To Practice: The Powell Doctrine * Prophets or Praetorians? The Uptonian Paradox and the Powell Corollary * Commitment of Force: Employing Force as an Instrument of Power * Potential Impacts of a Politicized U.S. Officer Corps * Nomination of Colin L. Powell to be Secretary Of State * Excerpt from The Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff - 1949-2012
General Colin L. Powell, USA, came to the chairmanship on 1 October 1989 determined to make full use of the Chairman's expanded authority. He had the advantage of being the first Chairman to serve his entire tenure under the Goldwater-Nichols Act. In addition, his extensive experience at the highest levels of government, his resulting close relationship with President George H. W. Bush and Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, and — during the last years of his tenure—the public prominence which he attained during the Persian Gulf War gave him considerable latitude in the exercise of the authority granted the Chairman under Goldwater-Nichols. Powell had a clear idea of what he wished to accomplish. As Secretary Weinberger's Military Assistant and President Reagan's National Security Adviser, he had found that the military advice produced by the corporate JCS system frequently did not meet policymakers' needs because it was often untimely and diluted. He was determined that that would not happen during his tenure. Foreseeing the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, he believed that it was his responsibility both to initiate a reorientation of military strategy in response to the changed world situation and to provide programming guidance to the services for a reduced force structure. Although he would have preferred having the Chiefs' support for his ideas, he was willing to proceed without it. When they did not endorse his views on strategy and force structure, he won the support of Secretary Cheney and President Bush for his proposals. Mindful of the operational and command prerogatives of the CINCs, Powell nevertheless exerted considerable influence on operations. During planning for the Panama operation in 1989 and the Persian Gulf War in 1990-1991, he pressed civilian leaders to identify national interests, examine all options, and define objectives before using military force. Once the decision to attack had been made, he played a major role in convincing the Bush administration to apply overwhelming force to achieve rapid success at low cost.
