Gulf War Logistics: Theory Into Practice - Desert Shield and Storm, Army Logistics from Vietnam to AirLand Battle, Ramifications of Schwarzkopf's Decision, Tactical Airlift, Ground Transportation
Nonfiction, History, Middle East, Persian Gulf War, Military, United States
| Author: | Progressive Management | ISBN: | 9781310103148 |
| Publisher: | Progressive Management | Publication: | May 19, 2016 |
| Imprint: | Smashwords Edition | Language: | English |
| Author: | Progressive Management |
| ISBN: | 9781310103148 |
| Publisher: | Progressive Management |
| Publication: | May 19, 2016 |
| Imprint: | Smashwords Edition |
| Language: | English |
This excellent report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. This Air Command and Staff College Gulf War Logistics research project is a paper that analyzes how logisticians, led by Lieutenant General William G. "Gus" Pagonis, put logistics theory into practice during the war. The paper asserts that timely departures from traditional Army logistics doctrine were absolutely essential to success in the Gulf War; it is divided into two main sections. The first is an overview of how Army logistics doctrine evolved in the decades prior to the Gulf War, especially as it related to the Vietnam War and the development of AirLand Battle. The second section of the paper focuses on how Gulf War logisticians applied, and modified, logistics doctrine to fit their unique circumstances. The paper discusses the ramifications of three key aspects of Pagonis's operation: first, his appointment as the single point of contact for logistics; second, his intentionally ad hoc approach to logistics; and, third, his development and use of a new-style logbase that stocked limited classes of supply and was located forward of US forces.
The paper concludes that Army logistics doctrine, developed over the previous decades, gave Gulf War logisticians the basis of a sound logistics plan on the eve of the war, but that, in its original form, this doctrine offered little help in dealing with the inevitable "friction" of war. The realities of the situation, in which tens of thousands of combat troops preceded logisticians into the theater, demanded innovation and flexibility. That is exactly what LTG Pagonis and his logisticians provided.
Background and Methodology * Statement of Purpose and Thesis * Statement of the Problem * Literature Review * Methodology * Army Logistics Doctrine: From Vietnam To AirLand Battle * The Theory Behind the Doctrine * Logistics Theory Into Practice - The Vietnam War * Post-Vietnam - Rethinking the Doctrine * Roots of Gulf War Logistics Doctrine: AirLand Battle Doctrine * Logistics In The Gulf War * The Theater and the Plan * The Challenge * A Single Logistics Leader: The First Doctrinal Deviation * Ramifications of Schwarzkopf's Decision * The First Hurdle: Reception of Forces * The Second Hurdle: Sustainment * A New-Style Logbase: The Second Doctrinal Deviation * Planning for the Ground War * Implementing the Logistics Plan * Tactical Airlift * Ground Transportation * Preparing to Enter the Fray * Findings and Conclusion
This excellent report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. This Air Command and Staff College Gulf War Logistics research project is a paper that analyzes how logisticians, led by Lieutenant General William G. "Gus" Pagonis, put logistics theory into practice during the war. The paper asserts that timely departures from traditional Army logistics doctrine were absolutely essential to success in the Gulf War; it is divided into two main sections. The first is an overview of how Army logistics doctrine evolved in the decades prior to the Gulf War, especially as it related to the Vietnam War and the development of AirLand Battle. The second section of the paper focuses on how Gulf War logisticians applied, and modified, logistics doctrine to fit their unique circumstances. The paper discusses the ramifications of three key aspects of Pagonis's operation: first, his appointment as the single point of contact for logistics; second, his intentionally ad hoc approach to logistics; and, third, his development and use of a new-style logbase that stocked limited classes of supply and was located forward of US forces.
The paper concludes that Army logistics doctrine, developed over the previous decades, gave Gulf War logisticians the basis of a sound logistics plan on the eve of the war, but that, in its original form, this doctrine offered little help in dealing with the inevitable "friction" of war. The realities of the situation, in which tens of thousands of combat troops preceded logisticians into the theater, demanded innovation and flexibility. That is exactly what LTG Pagonis and his logisticians provided.
Background and Methodology * Statement of Purpose and Thesis * Statement of the Problem * Literature Review * Methodology * Army Logistics Doctrine: From Vietnam To AirLand Battle * The Theory Behind the Doctrine * Logistics Theory Into Practice - The Vietnam War * Post-Vietnam - Rethinking the Doctrine * Roots of Gulf War Logistics Doctrine: AirLand Battle Doctrine * Logistics In The Gulf War * The Theater and the Plan * The Challenge * A Single Logistics Leader: The First Doctrinal Deviation * Ramifications of Schwarzkopf's Decision * The First Hurdle: Reception of Forces * The Second Hurdle: Sustainment * A New-Style Logbase: The Second Doctrinal Deviation * Planning for the Ground War * Implementing the Logistics Plan * Tactical Airlift * Ground Transportation * Preparing to Enter the Fray * Findings and Conclusion
