Joint Operations in the Gulf War: An Allison Analysis of Behavior - Rational, Organizational, Bureaucratic Process, Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force, Battlefield Preparation, Deep Strike Coordination

Nonfiction, History, Middle East, Persian Gulf War, Military, Aviation
Cover of the book Joint Operations in the Gulf War: An Allison Analysis of Behavior - Rational, Organizational, Bureaucratic Process, Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force, Battlefield Preparation, Deep Strike Coordination by Progressive Management, Progressive Management
View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart
Author: Progressive Management ISBN: 9781370785049
Publisher: Progressive Management Publication: September 25, 2016
Imprint: Smashwords Edition Language: English
Author: Progressive Management
ISBN: 9781370785049
Publisher: Progressive Management
Publication: September 25, 2016
Imprint: Smashwords Edition
Language: English

This important report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. To what extent was the effectiveness of joint operations in the Gulf War influenced by individual service perspectives? This study uses Graham Allison's three models of bureaucratic behavior (Model I, Rational Actor; Model II, Organizational Process; and Model III, Bureaucratic Politics) to answer this question. The value of interservice integration has been recognized for a long time. The Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols) made significant strides integrating the services at the most senior levels, that is, the component commanders and above. The study concludes that, in general, at the component commander level and above during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, rational decisions were made and rational actions were implemented to prosecute the war (Model I behavior). The Goldwater-Nichols legislation did not make as much headway, however, in integrating the services below the level of component commander. Unlike the most senior levels of command, decisions made and actions taken were not always implemented for the most rational reason. For the most part, decisions and actions were Model I. But a times, decisions and actions were not optimal because the decisionmaker/actor lacked information, had a different service perspective, and/or inadequately understood and empathized with members of the other services (primarily Model II, but with traces of Model III as well). Based on these findings, the study suggests in order to continue to improve interservice integration, we need to teach concepts of service integration early in an officer's career, expand joint interaction and provide some additional standardization among theaters.
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION * CHAPTER 2 - METHODOLOGY * Jointness * Allison's Models * Observations * Notes * CHAPTER 3 - THE UNITED STATES NAVY * Beyond Visual Range Rules of Engagement * Analysis * Joint Operations * Notes * CHAPTER 4 - THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS * Marine Air Operations * Analysis * Joint Operations * Notes * CHAPTER 5 - THE UNITED STATES ARMY * Battlefield Preparation * Analysis * Joint Operations * Notes * CHAPTER 6 - THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE * Deep Strike Coordination * Analysis * Joint Operations * Notes * CHAPTER 7 - CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS * Command * Doctrine * Command Location * CINC Interaction with Tactical Commanders * Information * Joint Force Integration * USAF/US Army Command Alignment * Summary * Notes

View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart

This important report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. To what extent was the effectiveness of joint operations in the Gulf War influenced by individual service perspectives? This study uses Graham Allison's three models of bureaucratic behavior (Model I, Rational Actor; Model II, Organizational Process; and Model III, Bureaucratic Politics) to answer this question. The value of interservice integration has been recognized for a long time. The Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols) made significant strides integrating the services at the most senior levels, that is, the component commanders and above. The study concludes that, in general, at the component commander level and above during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, rational decisions were made and rational actions were implemented to prosecute the war (Model I behavior). The Goldwater-Nichols legislation did not make as much headway, however, in integrating the services below the level of component commander. Unlike the most senior levels of command, decisions made and actions taken were not always implemented for the most rational reason. For the most part, decisions and actions were Model I. But a times, decisions and actions were not optimal because the decisionmaker/actor lacked information, had a different service perspective, and/or inadequately understood and empathized with members of the other services (primarily Model II, but with traces of Model III as well). Based on these findings, the study suggests in order to continue to improve interservice integration, we need to teach concepts of service integration early in an officer's career, expand joint interaction and provide some additional standardization among theaters.
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION * CHAPTER 2 - METHODOLOGY * Jointness * Allison's Models * Observations * Notes * CHAPTER 3 - THE UNITED STATES NAVY * Beyond Visual Range Rules of Engagement * Analysis * Joint Operations * Notes * CHAPTER 4 - THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS * Marine Air Operations * Analysis * Joint Operations * Notes * CHAPTER 5 - THE UNITED STATES ARMY * Battlefield Preparation * Analysis * Joint Operations * Notes * CHAPTER 6 - THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE * Deep Strike Coordination * Analysis * Joint Operations * Notes * CHAPTER 7 - CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS * Command * Doctrine * Command Location * CINC Interaction with Tactical Commanders * Information * Joint Force Integration * USAF/US Army Command Alignment * Summary * Notes

More books from Progressive Management

Cover of the book U.S. Army Medical Correspondence Course: Therapeutics III - Respiratory System, Cardiovascular and Lymphatic Systems, Cardiac Drugs, Vasodilators, Urogenital, Antihypertensive Agents by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Decade of War, Volume I: Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations - Mistakes and Failures in the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, Strategic Themes and Recommendations by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Toward a Theory of Spacepower: Selected Essays - Commercial Space, Launch Services, Tourism, Civil Space Authority, Moon, Mars, National Security, Warfare, Russia, China, India, Space Law, ASAT by Progressive Management
Cover of the book 21st Century FEMA Study Course: National Incident Management System (NIMS) Resource Management (IS-703.a) - Scenarios, Complex Incidents, Planning, Readiness by Progressive Management
Cover of the book 20th Century Nuclear Power Plant Accidents: Three Mile Island (TMI) Reactor Accident in Pennsylvania - Partial Meltdown, Radiation Releases, Causes, Report of the Presidential Commission on TMI by Progressive Management
Cover of the book 21st Century Pediatric Cancer Sourcebook: Childhood Central Nervous System Embryonal Tumors - Medulloblastoma, Pineoblastoma, Pineal Parenchymal Tumors, PNET, Medulloepithelioma, Ependymoblastoma by Progressive Management
Cover of the book FBI Report: Crime in Schools and Colleges: A Study of Offenders and Arrestees Reported via National Incident-Based Reporting System Data by Progressive Management
Cover of the book A-10 Thunderbolt II (Warthog) Systems Engineering Case Study - Close Air Support (CAS) Aircraft by Progressive Management
Cover of the book The Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident - The Tragedy of Mission 51-L in 1986 - Volume 4 Hearings (February 6 - 25, 1986) by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Council of War: A History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1942-1991 - War in Europe, Atomic Era, H-Bomb Decision, Cold War, Missile Gap, BMD, Cuban Missile Crisis, Vietnam, Iran Hostage Rescue, Iraq by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Aghas, Sheiks, and Daesh in Iraq: Kurdish Robust Action in Turmoil - ISIS, ISIL, Islamic State, Iraqi Kurdistan, Special Operations Forces (SOF), Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Mobility, Support, Endurance: A Story of Naval Operational Logistics in the Vietnam War 1965-1968 - Pueblo and Lloyd Bucher, Forces Afloat, Seventh Fleet, Inshore and Inland Waterways by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Leading The Way: The History of Air Force Civil Engineers, 1907-2012 - Airfields, Red Horse, World War I and II, Special Projects, DEW Line, BMEWS, ICBM, Atlas, Titan, Minuteman, Air Force Academy by Progressive Management
Cover of the book 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing: Terrorist Tragedy at the Murrah Federal Building - Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, Foreign Connections, Right-Wing Domestic Terrorists, OKBOMB Task Force by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Rendezvous In Space: A Look In on Military Space Power - Effects of Starfish Prime Nuclear Explosion on Space Policy, Comparison of Space Power to Air Power by Progressive Management
We use our own "cookies" and third party cookies to improve services and to see statistical information. By using this website, you agree to our Privacy Policy