Resource Allocation in Decentralized Systems with Strategic Agents

An Implementation Theory Approach

Nonfiction, Computers, Computer Hardware, Input-Output Equipment, Science & Nature, Technology, Telecommunications
Cover of the book Resource Allocation in Decentralized Systems with Strategic Agents by Ali Kakhbod, Springer New York
View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart
Author: Ali Kakhbod ISBN: 9781461463191
Publisher: Springer New York Publication: January 24, 2013
Imprint: Springer Language: English
Author: Ali Kakhbod
ISBN: 9781461463191
Publisher: Springer New York
Publication: January 24, 2013
Imprint: Springer
Language: English

This thesis presents a significant contribution to decentralized resource allocation problems with strategic agents. The study focused on three classes of problems arising in communication networks. (C1). Unicast service provisioning in wired networks. (C2). Multi-rate multicast service provisioning in wired networks. (C3). Power allocation and spectrum sharing in multi-user multi-channel wireless communication systems.  Problems in (C1) are market problems; problems in (C2) are a combination of markets and public goods; problems in (C3) are public goods. Dr. Kakhbod developed game forms/mechanisms for unicast and multi-rate multicast service provisioning that possess specific properties. First, the allocations corresponding to all Nash equilibria (NE) of the games induced by the mechanisms are optimal solutions of the corresponding centralized allocation problems, where the objective is the maximization of the sum of the agents'  utilities.  Second, the strategic agents voluntarily participate in the allocation process.  Third, the budget is balanced at the allocations corresponding to all NE of the game induced by the mechanism as well as at all other feasible allocations. For the power allocation and spectrum sharing problem, he developed a game form that possesses the second and third properties as detailed above along with a fourth property: the allocations corresponding to all NE of the game induced by the mechanism are Pareto optimal. The thesis contributes to the state of the art of mechanism design theory. In particular, designing efficient mechanisms for the class of problems that are a combination of markets and public goods, for the first time, have been addressed in this thesis.  The exposition, although highly rigorous and technical, is elegant and insightful which makes this thesis work easily accessible to those just entering this field and will also be much appreciated by experts in the field.

View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart

This thesis presents a significant contribution to decentralized resource allocation problems with strategic agents. The study focused on three classes of problems arising in communication networks. (C1). Unicast service provisioning in wired networks. (C2). Multi-rate multicast service provisioning in wired networks. (C3). Power allocation and spectrum sharing in multi-user multi-channel wireless communication systems.  Problems in (C1) are market problems; problems in (C2) are a combination of markets and public goods; problems in (C3) are public goods. Dr. Kakhbod developed game forms/mechanisms for unicast and multi-rate multicast service provisioning that possess specific properties. First, the allocations corresponding to all Nash equilibria (NE) of the games induced by the mechanisms are optimal solutions of the corresponding centralized allocation problems, where the objective is the maximization of the sum of the agents'  utilities.  Second, the strategic agents voluntarily participate in the allocation process.  Third, the budget is balanced at the allocations corresponding to all NE of the game induced by the mechanism as well as at all other feasible allocations. For the power allocation and spectrum sharing problem, he developed a game form that possesses the second and third properties as detailed above along with a fourth property: the allocations corresponding to all NE of the game induced by the mechanism are Pareto optimal. The thesis contributes to the state of the art of mechanism design theory. In particular, designing efficient mechanisms for the class of problems that are a combination of markets and public goods, for the first time, have been addressed in this thesis.  The exposition, although highly rigorous and technical, is elegant and insightful which makes this thesis work easily accessible to those just entering this field and will also be much appreciated by experts in the field.

More books from Springer New York

Cover of the book Office-Based Infertility Practice by Ali Kakhbod
Cover of the book Mining and Quarrying in the Ancient Andes by Ali Kakhbod
Cover of the book Manual of Diagnostic and Therapeutic Techniques for Disorders of Deglutition by Ali Kakhbod
Cover of the book Computing with Memory for Energy-Efficient Robust Systems by Ali Kakhbod
Cover of the book Narcolepsy by Ali Kakhbod
Cover of the book The Mathematics of Paul Erdős II by Ali Kakhbod
Cover of the book The Behavioral Consequences of Stroke by Ali Kakhbod
Cover of the book Variceal Hemorrhage by Ali Kakhbod
Cover of the book Pervasive Health Knowledge Management by Ali Kakhbod
Cover of the book Cannabinoid Modulation of Emotion, Memory, and Motivation by Ali Kakhbod
Cover of the book The Ethics of Social Research by Ali Kakhbod
Cover of the book Scleroderma by Ali Kakhbod
Cover of the book Autism Service Delivery by Ali Kakhbod
Cover of the book Residue Reviews by Ali Kakhbod
Cover of the book Cognitive Development in Adulthood by Ali Kakhbod
We use our own "cookies" and third party cookies to improve services and to see statistical information. By using this website, you agree to our Privacy Policy