Analytic Culture in the U.S. Intelligence Community: An Ethnographic Study - Working as an Intelligence Analyst, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Intelligence Papers

Nonfiction, Social & Cultural Studies, Political Science, Government
Cover of the book Analytic Culture in the U.S. Intelligence Community: An Ethnographic Study - Working as an Intelligence Analyst, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Intelligence Papers by Progressive Management, Progressive Management
View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart
Author: Progressive Management ISBN: 9781476281148
Publisher: Progressive Management Publication: March 12, 2012
Imprint: Smashwords Edition Language: English
Author: Progressive Management
ISBN: 9781476281148
Publisher: Progressive Management
Publication: March 12, 2012
Imprint: Smashwords Edition
Language: English

From the Foreword: It is a rare season when the intelligence story in the news concerns intelligence analysis, not secret operations abroad. The United States is having such a season as it debates whether intelligence failed in the run-up to both September 11 and the second Iraq war, and so Rob Johnston's wonderful book is perfectly timed to provide the back-story to those headlines. The CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence is to be commended for having the good sense to find Johnston and the courage to support his work, even though his conclusions are not what many in the world of intelligence analysis would like to hear.

He reaches those conclusions through the careful procedures of an anthropologist—conducting literally hundreds of interviews and observing and participating in dozens of work groups in intelligence analysis—and so they cannot easily be dismissed as mere opinion, still less as the bitter mutterings of those who have lost out in the bureaucratic wars. His findings constitute not just a strong indictment of the way American intelligence performs analysis, but also, and happily, a guide for how to do better.

Johnston finds no baseline standard analytic method. Instead, the most common practice is to conduct limited brainstorming on the basis of previous analysis, thus producing a bias toward confirming earlier views. The validating of data is questionable—for instance, the Directorate of Operations' (DO) "cleaning" of spy reports doesn't permit testing of their validity—reinforcing the tendency to look for data that confirms, not refutes, prevailing hypotheses. The process is risk averse, with considerable managerial conservatism. There is much more emphasis on avoiding error than on imagining surprises. The analytic process is driven by current intelligence, especially the CIA's crown jewel analytic product, the President's Daily Brief (PDB), which might be caricatured as "CNN plus secrets." Johnston doesn't put it quite that way, but the Intelligence Community does more reporting than in-depth analysis.

None of the analytic agencies knows much about the analytic techniques of the others. In all, there tends to be much more emphasis on writing and communication skills than on analytic methods. Training is driven more by the druthers of individual analysts than by any strategic view of the agencies and what they need. Most training is on-the-job.

Johnston identifies the needs for analysis of at least three different types of consumers—cops, spies, and soldiers. The needs of those consumers produce at least three distinct types of intelligence—investigative or operational, strategic, and tactical.

The research suggests the need for serious study of analytic methods across all three, guided by professional methodologists. Analysts should have many more opportunities to do fieldwork abroad. They should also move much more often across the agency "stovepipes" they now inhabit. These movements would give them a richer sense for how other agencies do analysis.

CHAPTER ONE - Definitions * CHAPTER TWO - Findings * CHAPTER THREE - A Taxonomy of Intelligence Variables * CHAPTER FOUR - Testing the Intelligence Cycle Through Systems Modeling and Simulation * CHAPTER FIVE - Integrating Methodologists into Teams of Experts * CHAPTER SIX - The Question of Foreign Cultures: Combating Ethnocentrism in Intelligence Analysis * CHAPTER SEVEN - Instructional Technology: Effectiveness and Implications for the Intelligence Community * CHAPTER EIGHT - Organizational Culture: Anticipatory Socialization and Intelligence Analysts * CHAPTER NINE - Recommendations: The First Step: Recognizing A Fundamental Problem * CHAPTER TEN - Survey Methodology * CHAPTER ELEVEN - Q-Sort Methodology * CHAPTER TWELVE - The "File-Drawer" Problem and Calculation of Effect Size

View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart

From the Foreword: It is a rare season when the intelligence story in the news concerns intelligence analysis, not secret operations abroad. The United States is having such a season as it debates whether intelligence failed in the run-up to both September 11 and the second Iraq war, and so Rob Johnston's wonderful book is perfectly timed to provide the back-story to those headlines. The CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence is to be commended for having the good sense to find Johnston and the courage to support his work, even though his conclusions are not what many in the world of intelligence analysis would like to hear.

He reaches those conclusions through the careful procedures of an anthropologist—conducting literally hundreds of interviews and observing and participating in dozens of work groups in intelligence analysis—and so they cannot easily be dismissed as mere opinion, still less as the bitter mutterings of those who have lost out in the bureaucratic wars. His findings constitute not just a strong indictment of the way American intelligence performs analysis, but also, and happily, a guide for how to do better.

Johnston finds no baseline standard analytic method. Instead, the most common practice is to conduct limited brainstorming on the basis of previous analysis, thus producing a bias toward confirming earlier views. The validating of data is questionable—for instance, the Directorate of Operations' (DO) "cleaning" of spy reports doesn't permit testing of their validity—reinforcing the tendency to look for data that confirms, not refutes, prevailing hypotheses. The process is risk averse, with considerable managerial conservatism. There is much more emphasis on avoiding error than on imagining surprises. The analytic process is driven by current intelligence, especially the CIA's crown jewel analytic product, the President's Daily Brief (PDB), which might be caricatured as "CNN plus secrets." Johnston doesn't put it quite that way, but the Intelligence Community does more reporting than in-depth analysis.

None of the analytic agencies knows much about the analytic techniques of the others. In all, there tends to be much more emphasis on writing and communication skills than on analytic methods. Training is driven more by the druthers of individual analysts than by any strategic view of the agencies and what they need. Most training is on-the-job.

Johnston identifies the needs for analysis of at least three different types of consumers—cops, spies, and soldiers. The needs of those consumers produce at least three distinct types of intelligence—investigative or operational, strategic, and tactical.

The research suggests the need for serious study of analytic methods across all three, guided by professional methodologists. Analysts should have many more opportunities to do fieldwork abroad. They should also move much more often across the agency "stovepipes" they now inhabit. These movements would give them a richer sense for how other agencies do analysis.

CHAPTER ONE - Definitions * CHAPTER TWO - Findings * CHAPTER THREE - A Taxonomy of Intelligence Variables * CHAPTER FOUR - Testing the Intelligence Cycle Through Systems Modeling and Simulation * CHAPTER FIVE - Integrating Methodologists into Teams of Experts * CHAPTER SIX - The Question of Foreign Cultures: Combating Ethnocentrism in Intelligence Analysis * CHAPTER SEVEN - Instructional Technology: Effectiveness and Implications for the Intelligence Community * CHAPTER EIGHT - Organizational Culture: Anticipatory Socialization and Intelligence Analysts * CHAPTER NINE - Recommendations: The First Step: Recognizing A Fundamental Problem * CHAPTER TEN - Survey Methodology * CHAPTER ELEVEN - Q-Sort Methodology * CHAPTER TWELVE - The "File-Drawer" Problem and Calculation of Effect Size

More books from Progressive Management

Cover of the book The Paradox of Power: Sino-American Strategic Restraint in an Age of Vulnerability - China and the U.S., Chinese Nuclear Weapons, Space, Cyberspace, Strategic Power, Cyber Warfare by Progressive Management
Cover of the book George Washington and the Politics of War and Revolution: American Revolutionary Leadership, Washington's Command - Power of Symbolism, Unity, and Purpose, Awakening of a Continent, Analysis Framework by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Soldiers of Misfortune? Blackwater USA, Private Military Security Contractors (PMSCs), Iraq War, Afghanistan War, Counterinsurgency (COIN) Campaigns, DynCorp, Zapata, Kroll by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Why Do Programs Fail? An Analysis of Defense Program Manager Decision-Making in Complex and Chaotic Program Environments: Impacted by Process, Control, Relationships, Motive, and Risk by Progressive Management
Cover of the book U.S. Nonproliferation Policy Towards North Korea: Nuclear Program, DPRK Belligerent Acts and American Responses, Potential for Military Action, New Types of Engagement, Six-Party Talks by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Turkey: Federal Research Study and Country Profile with Comprehensive Information, History, and Analysis - Politics, Economy, Military - Istanbul, Ataturk, Islamists, Armenian Genocide by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Between Heroes and Guardians: General Lyman L. Lemnitzer and General Charles H. Bonesteel III - World War II and Cold War, Operation Torch, Project Solarium, Interwar Period and Wartime Careers by Progressive Management
Cover of the book A Concise History of the U.S. Air Force: From the Genesis of American Air Power to the Gulf War, World War II, Nuclear Age and Cold War, Billy Mitchell, Foulois, von Richtofen, Spaatz by Progressive Management
Cover of the book GITMO, Terrorists, and Enhanced Interrogation: The Legality, Utility and Morality of Coercion, Regaining the Moral High Ground, Reparations for Guantanamo Detainees, Comparison to Japanese Internment by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Military Testing Facilities and Equipment - Army Natick Soldier RD and E Center (NSRDEC): Human Systems, Clothing, Engineering, Polymer, Mechanical Testing and Analysis, Applied Science, Food by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Hammer Down: The Battle for the Watapur Valley, 2011 - War in Afghanistan Vanguard of Valor Series, Fight Against Taliban and al-Qaeda, Task Force Cacti by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Tunisia in Perspective: Orientation Guide and Tunisian Cultural Orientation: Geography, History, Economy, Security, Bourguiba, Ben Ali, Tunis, Sfax, Sousse, Bizerte, Berbers, Wadi Medjerda, Ottoman by Progressive Management
Cover of the book 20th Century NASA Space History: Mir Mission Chronicle - Modules, Configuration Changes, Major Events of the Russian/Soviet Space Station by Progressive Management
Cover of the book 2016 Leadership From the Center: A New Foreign and Security Policy for Germany - Bismarck, Realpolitik, Evolution of Civilian Power, NATO, Emerging Defense Policy, Eurozone Migrant and Economic Crisis by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Russian Organizational Learning in the Context of the Afghanistan and Chechnya Counterinsurgencies: Soviet Military History, Operational Art, World War II, Interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia by Progressive Management
We use our own "cookies" and third party cookies to improve services and to see statistical information. By using this website, you agree to our Privacy Policy